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You Shall Not Pass!  
How the Dublin System Fueled Fortress Europe 
Ashley Binetti Armstrong 
Abstract 
 
This Article examines the recent proliferation of walls and fences in Europe, fueled by the 
Dublin Regulation’s failure to distribute responsibility for asylum seekers equitably among 
European states. Legal scholarship does not lack literature bemoaning the failures of the E.U.’s 
Dublin Regulation—which dictates, generally, that the country where an asylum seeker first 
enters the E.U. is responsible for processing his or her claim for protection. Yet scholarship on 
border walls and fences, and what induces European states to construct them, is not prominent 
in the literature. The critiques lodged against the Dublin Regulation have primarily focused on 
its futility and unworkability. This Article argues that Dublin has failed asylum seekers in a 
more insidious way—by catalyzing the construction of Fortress Europe. The actions of European 
states during the contemporary refugee “crisis” illustrate this phenomenon particularly well. 
Section II of this Article examines the contours of the international principle of 
responsibility-sharing; a principle that is supported throughout the history of refugee law as an 
ideal modality for managing refugee flows. Section III provides an overview of the Dublin 
Regulation and how it distorts the international responsibility-sharing principle and violates 
E.U. law requiring “solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility” among member states. Section 
IV traces the proliferation of border walls and fences in Europe around the height of the recent 
refugee crisis, arguing that the Dublin Regulation’s failure fueled European states to erect physical 
border barriers. It also explores the formidable combination of physical and legal barriers and 
how these mechanisms violate member states’ non-refoulement obligation. Section V analyzes 
proposals for improving Dublin, including efforts to better protect refugee rights and achieve a 
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more equitable sharing of responsibility for protection seekers. This Article concludes by 
questioning how the E.U. can move forward and uphold the right of all persons fleeing persecution 
to seek and enjoy asylum in Europe. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fortress Europe . . . has severely limited the safe and legal avenues of entry for refugees to 
the EU at the same time as an explosion in the global refugee population. [This] has 
inevitably generated considerable pressure on the EU’s periphery states—particularly 
Greece and Italy, who are struggling to cope with the increase in arrivals of refugees and 
migrants . . . [and] reflect the need for both greater global solidarity, in response to the ever-
growing refugee crisis, and greater internal solidarity between EU member states that 
currently share the responsibility for receiving asylum seekers unequally.1 
In September 2015, shortly after Hungary completed construction of a fence 
on its border with Serbia, an image haunted the internet.2 It was a photograph of 
a young boy, maybe three years old. He was visibly upset. A middle-aged man was 
holding the boy. The man was bleeding from his head—an injury he suffered 
during a clash with the police who were also featured in the photo, donning riot 
gear. The caption described how “Hungarian police fired tear gas and water 
cannons at migrants demanding to be allowed to enter from Serbia.”3 These were 
asylum seekers4 who were fleeing persecution, eager to apply for protection in 
Europe. 
Even after the fall of the Berlin Wall, European states have continued to 
erect walls.5 States justify these barriers in the name of halting “illegal” 
immigration, protecting their country from terrorists, blocking economic migrants 
intent on stealing the jobs of their nationals, and maintaining the purity of their 
Christian, Western culture.6 But fences do not discriminate, they are designed to 
                                                 
1  Amnesty Int’l, Europe’s Borderlands: Violations Against Refugees and Migrants in Macedonia, Serbia and 
Hungary, at 67, AI Index EUR 70/1579/2015 (July 7, 2015), http://perma.cc/N2YD-NNFZ. 
2  See Liz Sullivan, The Week in Pictures, MACLEAN’S MAGAZINE (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/E79J-NRLD. 
3  See id. 
4  China Global Television Network, Refugees Clash with Police at Serbia-Hungary Border, YOUTUBE (Sept. 
16, 2015), http://perma.cc/YLP2-WJ72 (“The clashes began as hundreds of asylum seekers asked 
the Hungarians to reopen [the border].”). 
5  See, for example, Gabriela Baczynska & Sara Ledwith, How Europe Built Fences to Keep People Out, 
REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2016), http://perma.cc/Q3VV-A46M (“[S]ince the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
European countries have built or started 1,200 km (750 miles) of anti-immigrant fencing.”); Jon 
Stone, The E.U. Has Built 1,000km of Border Walls Since Fall of Berlin Wall, THE INDEPENDENT (Nov. 
9, 2018), http://perma.cc/5PCA-Y6MY (“[T]he EU has gone from just two walls in the 1990s to 
15 by 2017 . . . with a sharp increase during the 2015 migration panic, when seven new barriers 
were erected.”). 
6  See, for example, Ashley B. Armstrong, Chutes and Ladders: Nonrefoulement and the Sisyphean Challenge of 
Seeking Asylum in Hungary, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 46, 53, 73–75 (2019) (Hungarian Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán is “defending European Christianity against a Muslim influx” and the 
Hungarian government paints immigrants “as terrorists and criminals.”). 
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block all migrants—including asylum seekers. European border barriers7 include 
earlier walls and fences installed before the height of the refugee crisis, such as the 
barrier Greece constructed on its land border with Turkey, completed in 
December 2012;8 and Bulgaria’s fence on its border with Turkey, which it finished 
constructing in summer 2014.9 During the height of the refugee crisis in 2015, 
Europe witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of walls and fences including:10 
Hungary’s fences on its Serbian11 and Croatian12 borders; North Macedonia’s 
fence on its border with Greece;13 Slovenia’s fence on its border with Croatia;14 
Austria’s fence on its border with Slovenia;15 and Croatia’s fence on its border 
with Serbia.16 
                                                 
7  This Article focuses on physical barriers constructed in response to the recent refugee crisis. This 
is not a comprehensive list of all physical borders in Europe. For a map of border walls and internal 
controls as of 2017, see U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Border Fences and Internal 
Border Controls in Europe (Mar. 2017), http://perma.cc/5PCK-JQXH (“In response to concerns 
regarding increased numbers of refugees and migrants arriving at their borders, several European 
States, including European Union (EU) Member States, have constructed fences along their borders 
and increased border controls, including internal border controls within the Schengen area.”). 
8  Danae Leivada, Why Greece Shut the Shortest, Safest Route for Migrants and Refugees, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Sept. 24, 2015), http://perma.cc/3NWZ-9EL8. 
9  Bulgarian Defense Minister: Border Fence to be Finished in June, SOFIA NEWS AGENCY (May 14, 2014), 
http://perma.cc/AJA9-M26Z; Rick Lyman, Bulgaria Puts Up a New Wall, but This One Keeps People 
Out, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), http://perma.cc/TW9W-JDS2. 
10  For a comprehensive list of walls and fences erected in Europe during the crisis, see, for example, 
Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto & Pere Brunet, Building Walls: Fear and Securitization in the European Union, 
CENTRE DELÀS D’ESTUDIS PER LA PAU Table 3 (Sept. 2018), http://perma.cc/TQ8Q-NHTL. 
Additionally, some of the barriers were later fortified with additional layers of fencing. See, for 
example, Marton Dunai, Hungary Builds New High-Tech Border Fence - With Few Migrants in Sight, 
REUTERS (Mar. 2, 2017), http://perma.cc/W85M-Q9R2. 
11  Hungary: New Border Regime Threatens Asylum Seekers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/AJ8A-LCKX. 
12  Migrant Crisis: Hungary Closes Border with Croatia, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/M3WT-6HDZ.  
13  Cynthia Kroet, Macedonia Builds Fence on Greek Border to Control Refugees, POLITICO (Nov. 28, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/AE8K-MEUC. North Macedonia, while not an E.U. member state, is included in 
this list because of its prominent position on the Balkan route. 
14  Barbara Surk, Slovenia Starts Building Border Fence to Stem Flow of Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/FT4Z-TJM7. 
15  Austria Begins Erecting Fence on Border with Slovenia, DEUTSCHE WELLE (July 12, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/L32R-Q4TG. 
16  This fence was completed in summer 2016. See Sven Milekic, Croatia Erects Serbian Border Fence to 
Deter Migrants, BALKAN INSIGHT (June 30, 2016), http://perma.cc/2VMZ-LNP3. Serbia, while not 
an E.U. member state, is included in this list because of its prominent position on the Balkan route. 
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This Article explores how the E.U.’s17 Dublin Regulation18 facilitated the 
birth of Fortress Europe. It examines how Dublin’s responsibility-allocation 
mechanism has failed those in need of protection, and what happens when 
responsibility for asylum seekers is not equitably shared. Legal scholarship does 
not lack literature bemoaning the failures of the E.U.’s Dublin Regulation—which 
generally assigns responsibility for processing protection claims to the country 
where an asylum seeker first enters the E.U. Yet scholarship on border walls and 
fences, and specifically what has induced European states to construct them, is 
not prominent in the literature.19 The critiques lodged against the Dublin 
Regulation have primarily focused on its futility and unworkability.20 Scholars have 
also criticized Dublin for harming refugee rights21 and rebuked Europe’s asylum 
                                                 
17  Reference to the E.U. herein includes European states who have agreed to Dublin and related 
regulations (i.e., Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland). 
18  See generally Section III (discussing evolution of the 1990 Dublin Convention into the European 
Community Dublin Regulation (“Dublin II”), and subsequently into the E.U.’s current Dublin 
Regulation (recast) (“Dublin III”)). 
19  There are few scholarly legal articles that discuss border walls, let alone in terms of their use to 
stymie migration flows. For three examples of literature that analyze border walls in their relation 
to migration control, see Moria Paz, Between the Kingdom and the Desert Sun: Human Rights, Immigration, 
and Border Walls, 34 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 2–5, 7–8 (2016) (discussing phenomenon of wealthy 
countries erecting border walls in response to human rights jurisprudence linking jurisdiction to 
physical presence or state control); Moria Paz, The Law of Walls, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 601, 602–03 
(2017) (discussing how Western democracies have built walls to control migration in response to 
decisions of human rights courts and quasi-judicial bodies); Ayelet Shachar, Bordering 
Migration/Migrating Borders, 37 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 93, 96–97 (2019) (discussing “the shifting 
border,” or legal barriers that states implement to restrict mobility). 
20  See, for example, Susan Fratzke, Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System, 
MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (2015) (evaluating Dublin II); Maryellen Fullerton, Asylum Crisis 
Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides with European Human Rights Law, 29 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 
60–64, 129 (2016) (discussing the “injustice and inefficiencies caused by the European Union (EU) 
Dublin (III) Regulation” and arguing that the “current Dublin Regulation should be suspended.” 
The author particularly notes that “the transaction costs of the Dublin system are enormous,” with 
states often “exchang[ing] similar numbers of Dublin requests with each other.”); see also UNHCR, 
Left in Limbo: UNHCR Study on the Implementation of the Dublin III Regulation 151 (Aug. 2017), 
http://perma.cc/9WB7-4PR8 (evaluating Dublin III and underscoring its many deficiencies, 
including the limited number of actual transfers, and further noting that the Regulation is not 
applied in a consistent manner); DG Migration and Home Affairs, Evaluation of the Implementation of 
the Dublin III Regulation, European Commission 56 (Mar. 18, 2016) (“[R]elative to the total number of 
Dublin outgoing requests and decisions, the number of outgoing transfers is very low”); Francesco 
Maiani, Reforming the Common European Asylum System: The New European Refugee Law, in 39 
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY IN EUROPE 106–107 (Vincent Chetail, Philippe De 
Bruycker & Francesco Maiani eds., 2016) (“[O]nly a tiny minority of the hundreds of thousands of 
procedures carried out every year yields the tangible result of a transfer (in the order of 3%).”). 
21  See, for example, Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Why Dublin “Doesn’t Work,” 135 NOTES 
INTERNACIONALS CIDOB 2–3 (Nov. 2015), http://perma.cc/A2HP-DQS8 (arguing that not only 
does Dublin not work fairly or efficiently, but also harms refugees’ rights); Violeta Moreno-Lax & 
Mariagiulia Giuffré, The Raise of Consensual Containment: From “Contactless Control” to “Contactless 
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policies more broadly as a “market of deflection.”22 This Article argues that Dublin 
has failed asylum seekers in a more insidious way—by catalyzing the construction 
of Fortress Europe, which aims to prevent refugees from accessing protection 
altogether. The actions of European states during the recent refugee “crisis,”23 in 
their construction of physical and legal barriers, illustrate this phenomenon 
particularly well. 
While correlation should not be confused with causation, it is well within the 
realm of possibility that European states, as rational actors, would either want to 
prevent asylum seekers from setting foot on their territory or wave them through 
without fingerprinting to avoid triggering responsibility under the Dublin 
Regulation. E.U. member states that border the sea, such as Greece and Italy, have 
primarily turned to interdiction on the high seas24 and other remote-control 
                                                 
Responsibility” for Forced Migration Flows, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INT’L REFUGEE LAW 2 (July 31, 
2017) (Dublin is responsible for “ignit[ing] a race to the bottom in protection.”); Ségolène Barbou 
des Places, Evolution of Asylum Legislation in the EU: Insights from Regulatory Competition Theory 9–10, 
(European University Institute, Working Paper No. 2003/16, 2003). 
22  See GREGOR NOLL, NEGOTIATING ASYLUM: THE E.U. ACQUIS, EXTRATERRITORIAL PROTECTION 
AND THE COMMON MARKET OF DEFLECTION 182–85, 595 (2000). 
23  This Article uses the term “crisis” because this is the label that the media, scholars, and other 
stakeholders commonly use to describe Europe’s refugee flows during this time. To qualify the term 
“crisis,” as it relates to roughly one million people arriving in Europe in 2015, note that in that same 
year developing regions hosted 85 percent of the world’s refugees, of which Least Developed 
Countries hosted 26 percent, or 4.2 million people. See UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED 
DISPLACEMENT IN 2015 2 (June 2016), http://perma.cc/L2NY-84N7. “Crisis” migrant flows in 
Europe comprised roughly .2 percent of the E.U.’s population. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Migration 
Emergencies, 68 HASTINGS L. J. 609, 618–19 (2017) (noting “[t]hese are wealthy destination nations 
whose financial capacity and expertise could enable them to process even larger numbers of 
migrants if they so chose.”). The following terms have also been used to describe this period of 
large-scale influx: “European migrant crisis,” “refugee crisis,” “asylum crisis,” and other related 
variations. 
24  While “interdiction” is often used in reference to the interception of migrants at sea, “[t]here is no 
legal definition of ‘interdiction’. The term is commonly taken to encompass all ‘measures applied 
by a State, outside its national territory, in order to prevent, interrupt or stop the movement of 
persons without the required documentation crossing international borders by land, air or sea, and 
making their way to the country of prospective destination.’” See Violeta Moreno-Lax, Policy Brief 4: 
The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (mal)practice in Europe and Australia, KALDOR CENTRE 
FOR INT’L REFUGEE LAW 14, n.4 (May 2017), http://perma.cc/9NYF-73GF (citing UNHCR, 
INTERCEPTION OF ASYLUM-SEEKERS AND REFUGEES: THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 10, EC/50/SC/CRP.17 (June 9, 2000)). 
Relatedly, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini has halted NGO “migrant search and rescue 
vessels” from docking in Italy. Salvini stated, “I take responsibility for being ugly, violent, bad, 
fascist, populist, Nazi, racist, but I do it because our children are safer on our streets.” Nick Miller, 
“No Way”: Italy’s Leader Takes Australian Cue on Refugees, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Aug. 24, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/Z9TK-TG4C (quoting Interview with Matteo Salvini (RTL radio broadcast Aug. 
23, 2018), http://perma.cc/Y2SP-ACBC (“Mi faccio carico di essere per qualcuno brutto, violento, 
cattivo, fascista, populista, nazista, razzista, ma lo faccio perché i nostri figli stiano un po’ più 
tranquilli per le nostre strade.”)). 
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policies25 to keep out refugees. Member states that form the land border of the 
E.U. and are themselves places of first arrival, or those states that have become 
the “new frontier” when refugees are waved-through or when original states of 
entry are not fit for Dublin returns,26 have turned to erecting walls and fences, in 
addition to creating legal barriers.27 
This Article explains the recent proliferation of walls and fences in Europe 
as grounded in the Dublin Regulation’s failure to distribute responsibility for 
asylum seekers equitably among European states. Very few publications––legal or 
otherwise––examine Europe’s walls and fences in relation to stymying irregular 
migration. Even those publications that have attempted to describe this 
phenomenon have not connected the construction of walls and fences in Europe 
to the Dublin Regulation’s influence.28 Some scholars have posited theories about 
the general rise in externalization policies, including securitization concerns, the 
influence of racism and politics, and the underlying incentive that territorialized 
asylum creates.29 Others have asserted that the recent proliferation of border walls 
in Western democracies is a reaction to the decisions of “human rights courts and 
quasi-judicial bodies.”30 This Article presents a different explanation that 
illuminates this phenomenon in the context of Europe’s failure to create an 
equitable, workable responsibility-allocation system for refugees. This theory is 
                                                 
25  See, for example, Moreno-Lax & Giuffré, supra note 21, at 3 (discussing examples of remote-control 
policies, or “contactless control,” such as the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding, 
information campaigns, and readmissions agreements, among others).  
26  See Section III (discussing M.S.S. v. Belg. and Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Jan. 21, 2011)). 
27  See, for example, Armstrong, supra note 6, at 49–51 (discussing Hungary’s fences and utilizing safe 
third country, deep border control policy, restricting asylum applications to two transit zones along 
Serbia’s border and only allowing one applicant per zone per workday to enter, arbitrarily detaining 
refugees in transit zone shipping containers while their applications are processed, and passing laws 
that criminalize assisting asylum seekers). While this Article focuses primarily on physical barriers, 
states employ a combination of physical and legal strategies to prevent entry. The argument 
presented in this Article regarding the failure of Dublin and its influence on the construction of 
Fortress Europe also applies to those legal “walls and fences.” While detailed analysis of those 
methods falls outside the scope of this Article, Section IV briefly discusses two examples and their 
broader implications for Fortress Europe: the E.U.–Turkey Deal and Hungary’s “Chutes and 
Ladders” asylum system. 
28  See, for example, Benedicto & Brunet, supra note 10 (“Dublin” is only mentioned once in this 58-page 
report on walls in the E.U.); TIM MARSHALL, THE AGE OF WALLS: HOW BARRIERS BETWEEN 
NATIONS ARE CHANGING OUR WORLD (2018); Maryellen Fullerton, Borders, Bans, and Courts in the 
European Union, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 393, 396 (2018) (discussing how Dublin places 
“enormous pressures on E.U. Member States along the southern and eastern borders”). 
29  See generally, DAVID SCOTT FITZGERALD, REFUGE BEYOND REACH: HOW RICH DEMOCRACIES 
REPEL ASYLUM SEEKERS 41–57 (2019).  
30  See Paz, The Law of Walls, supra note 19, at 602–03. 
How the Dublin System Fueled Fortress Europe Armstrong 
Winter 2020 339 
not exclusive of other explanations, but it helps explain state behavior in the ever-
growing Fortress Europe and lends itself to targeted legal and policy solutions. 
Section II begins by examining the contours of the international principle of 
responsibility-sharing, a principle that is supported throughout the history of 
refugee law as an ideal modality for managing refugee flows. Section III provides 
an overview of the Dublin Regulation and how it distorts the international 
responsibility-sharing principle and violates E.U. law requiring “solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility” among member states.31 Section IV traces the 
proliferation of border walls and fences in Europe during the height of the 2015 
refugee crisis, arguing that the Dublin Regulation’s failure fueled European states’ 
construction of physical border barriers. It also explores the formidable 
combination of physical and legal barriers and how these mechanisms violate 
member states’ non-refoulement obligation. Finally, Section V analyzes proposals 
for improving the Dublin system, including efforts to protect refugee rights more 
effectively and achieve a more equitable sharing of responsibility for protection 
seekers. This Article concludes by questioning how the E.U. can move forward 
and uphold the right of all persons to seek and enjoy asylum.32 
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY-SHARING IN 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 
On 28 July 1951, when the [Refugee] Convention was adopted, the world was recovering 
from a deeply traumatizing and destructive period of global war and human rights violations 
on a horrendous scale. The inspiration for the Convention was the strong international 
concern to ensure that the disregard for human life, the displacement and the persecution of 
the war years would not be repeated.33 
States acknowledged the need for a protection regime for persons fleeing 
persecution when they adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention.34 The 1951 
                                                 
31  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 80, Mar. 25, 
1958, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 17, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306), 
entered into force Dec. 1, 2009) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
32  One has a right to seek and enjoy asylum. See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. E.U. member states also have a legal obligation 
to ensure the right to asylum under regional law. See Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, art. 18, 2012 O.J. (C 326/391). 
33  Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Note on International Protection, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.96/951 (Sept. 13, 2001), http://perma.cc/3XSC-4524. 
34  See generally 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1, opened for signature July 28, 
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter 1951 
Convention]. The Convention defines “refugee” as a person who asserts a well-founded fear of 
persecution based on her “race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion” and is compelled to seek protection (asylum) outside of her home country. Id. at 
art. 1A(2). 
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Convention initially only protected those who became refugees because of the 
events in Europe occurring before January 1951, but persecution, war, and 
displacement did not end with World War II. Therefore, U.N. member states 
ultimately expanded the temporal and physical application of the Convention with 
the 1967 Protocol.35 Heralded under the banner of “Never again!,” this regime 
was born out of the failure of states to share responsibility effectively and protect 
refugees fleeing Nazi persecution, resulting in egregious consequences.36 From 
early on in this protection regime, states recognized that no country alone should 
be responsible for the world’s refugees and that successful protection efforts 
required solidarity.37 International and regional treaties and declarations have 
affirmed and reaffirmed support for the principle of responsibility-sharing in 
refugee law. 
Effective responsibility-sharing aims to protect refugees and displaced 
persons by promoting durable solutions “while addressing undue burdens on host 
countries and communities.”38 This Article focuses on the physical aspect of 
responsibility-sharing—in other words, processing protection claims and hosting 
refugees. This is the brand of responsibility-sharing that Dublin has perverted and 
that states seek to rectify by constructing walls and fences. States use these barriers 
to avoid their obligation to provide durable solutions to protection seekers by 
preventing them from entering their territory. 
                                                 
35  See 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. For an overview of the “modern international refugee law regime,” 
see Andrew I. Schoenholtz, The New Refugees and The Old Treaty: Persecutors and Persecuted in the Twenty-
First Century, 16 CHI. J. INT’L L. 81, 85–86 (2015). 
36  See, for example, Timeline of Events: Evian Conference, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, 
http://perma.cc/W5DB-TZ6L (describing the failure of the Evian Conference, July 6–15, 1938). 
37  See, for example, G.A. Res. 8(I), art. c(iii), Question of Refugees (Feb. 12, 1946); see also 1951 
Convention, supra note 34, at pmbl. (“Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy 
burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United 
Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without 
international co-operation.”) (emphasis added). 
38  See, for example, Susan F. Martin et al., International Responsibility-Sharing for Refugees 13 (Global 
Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, Working Paper No. 32, 2018) 
(acknowledging three core goals of responsibility-sharing: (1) prevent the causes of displacement; 
(2) protect refugees and internally displaced persons “while addressing burden on hosts and 
communities”; and (3) promote durable solutions (local integration, return, and resettlement)). 
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This Section establishes and reaffirms responsibility-sharing39 as a principle 
of international refugee law.40 First, it explores this principle in the context of the 
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) 
Resolutions, and UNHCR ExCom Conclusions. It then examines the more recent 
history of international responsibility-sharing as it has been incorporated in the 
New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and the 2018 Global Compacts. 
A. Foundations of Responsibil ity-Sharing in International 
Refugee Law 
The principles of interstate cooperation and responsibility-sharing are 
foundational to modern international law, dating back to their inclusion in the 
U.N. Charter.41 The 1951 Refugee Convention42 and the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees43 establish that these concepts have been essential 
components of the international refugee protection regime since its inception. The 
importance of responsibility-sharing is one of the first principles highlighted in 
the 1951 Convention’s preambulatory text: “[C]onsidering that the grant of 
asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a 
satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized 
the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without 
international co-operation.”44 
                                                 
39  This article primarily uses the term “responsibility-sharing” as opposed to “burden-sharing.” 
“Burden” carries a negative connotation, as opposed to “responsibility,” which evinces the positive 
obligation of all states to assist refugees. For more on terminology, see Rebecca Dowd & Jane 
McAdam, International Cooperation and Responsibility-Sharing to Protect Refugees: What, Why and How?, 66 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 863, 868–71 (2017); see also James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making 
International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 145–48 (1997). 
40  Responsibility-sharing is a principle of international refugee law, if not yet a “critical norm.” See, for 
example, J.-P. L. Fonteyne, Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of International Solidarity 
in Cases of Mass Influx of Refugees, 8 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 162, 184 (1978–80) (contending that the 
obligation of responsibility-sharing and solidarity in response to refugee protection rises to the level 
of customary international law). Compare Dowd & McAdam, supra note 39, at 879–80 (contending 
that responsibility-sharing is not customary international law but rather a “critical norm of 
international refugee law. . . [that] does not impose legally binding obligations on states”). 
41  U.N. Charter, art. 1, ¶ 3, arts. 55–56, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. 16 (on international cooperation 
and obligation to cooperate, respectively); see also G.A. Res. 26/25, pmbl., Declaration on Principle 
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
42  1951 Convention, supra note 34. 
43  1967 Protocol, supra note 35. 
44  1951 Convention, supra note 34, at pmbl. (emphasis added). 
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The 1951 Convention, however, did not set out a mechanism for achieving 
international cooperation.45 While the Convention failed to provide concrete rules 
on responsibility-sharing, it delineated states’ responsibilities to refugees.46 The 
obligation to allow persons to apply for asylum47 and not to send them back to 
places of persecution (refouler)48 are chief among these responsibilities. Under 
international law’s canons of construction, these obligations must be interpreted 
in light of the intent and purpose of the Convention, which is indicated in the 
treaty text “including its preamble and annexes.”49 As such, the principle of 
international cooperation underpins states’ responsibilities to refugees, even if the 
Convention does not otherwise provide guidance on how states must engage in 
this practice.50 
                                                 
45  States ultimately rejected the U.N. Secretary-General’s quota proposal, which would have obligated 
each state “to receive a certain number of refugees.” See Memorandum from the Secretary-General 
to the U.N. Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness 
and Related Problems, Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons - Memorandum by the Secretary-General, II, ch. 
2, art. 3, E/AC.32/2 (Jan. 3, 1950), http://perma.cc/5GNN-YZVS (“The High Contracting Parties 
shall to the fullest possible extent relieve the burden assumed by initial reception countries which 
have afforded asylum to person to whom paragraph 1 refers. They shall do so, inter alia, by agreeing 
to receive a certain number of refugees in their territory.”) (emphasis added). 
46  See, for example, Dowd & McAdam, supra note 39, at 863 (“While countries that receive refugees 
have certain legal obligations to assist and protect them, the legal duties of other States to step in 
and help relieve this burden is less clear.”). 
47  “Grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which recognizes the 
right of persons to seek asylum from persecution in other countries, the United Nations Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, is the centrepiece of international refugee 
protection today.” UNHCR, Introductory Note to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(Dec. 2010), in the 1951 Convention, supra note 34; see also UDHR, supra note 32, at art. 14(1) 
(“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”). 
48  Non-refoulement is enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention: “No Contracting State shall 
expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where 
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.” 1951 Convention, supra note 34, at art. 33, ¶ 1. 
This Convention protection does not apply to individuals who are considered a “danger to the 
security of the country” or those who have been convicted of “a particularly serious crime.” Id. at 
art. 33(2). Under the Convention Against Torture, however, the non-refoulement principle is non-
derogable and applies broadly to any person who would suffer torture and/or inhuman and 
degrading treatment upon return. See U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
Convention against Torture]; see also U.N. Committee against Torture, Gen. Comment No. 2, U.N. 
Doc, CAT/C/GC/2, ¶ 3 (Jan. 24, 2008), http://perma.cc/S4BQ-6BY2. 
49  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose . . . . The context 
for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes.”) (emphasis added). 
50  See 1951 Convention, supra note 34, at pmbl. 
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Other sources of international law support the responsibility-sharing 
principle, including UNGA resolutions. While UNGA resolutions are not 
binding, they serve an advisory function in interpreting the meaning of binding 
international legal instruments.51 Several years after the passage of the 1951 
Convention, states adopted the 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, which 
underscored state responsibility to assist “in a spirit of international solidarity” 
when another state “finds difficulty in granting or continuing to grant asylum.”52 
Additionally, in the 1993 Vienna Declaration on Human Rights and Programme 
of Action, UNGA member states echoed the 1951 Convention’s assertion that “a 
satisfactory solution” requires “international co-operation,”53 and called upon 
states to institute a coordinated approach to assisting the world’s refugees.54 
UNGA again affirmed the “enduring importance”55 of the 1951 Convention and 
called for a coordinated approach to assisting refugees in the 2001 Declaration of 
States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees: “[R]espect by States for their protection responsibilities 
towards refugees is strengthened by international solidarity . . . and . . . the refugee 
protection regime is enhanced through committed international cooperation in a spirit of 
solidarity and effective responsibility and burden-sharing among all States.”56 Many other 
                                                 
51  UNGA resolutions are categorized as recommendations, but they have interpretive value and assist 
in establishing and identifying customary international legal norms. See, for example, Volker Turk & 
Madeline Garlick, From Burdens and Responsibilities to Opportunities: the Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework and a Global Compact on Refugees, 28 INT’L J. REF. L. 656, 659 n.10 (2016) (Articles 10 and 
14 of the U.N. Charter refer to UNGA resolutions as “recommendations,” and the International 
Court of Justice has stressed their advisory nature in numerous cases. However, they may provide 
evidence of states’ views, including on the nature of their legal obligations (opinio juris), which, 
together with a clearly established pattern of state practice, can become a source of customary 
international law.). 
52  G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), Declaration on Territorial Asylum, art. 2, ¶ 2 (Dec. 14, 1967). 
53  Compare id. (“Where a state finds difficulty in granting or continuing to grant asylum, States 
individually or jointly or through the United Nations shall consider, in a spirit of international 
solidary, appropriate measures to lighten the burden on that state.”) with 1951 Convention, supra 
note 34, at pmbl. (“Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognized 
the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-
operation . . . .”). 
54  World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 23, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993), http://perma.cc/QLJ2-V4WF. 
55  G.A. Res. 57/187, Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, pmbl. ¶ 2 (Dec. 31, 2001). 
56  Id. at pmbl. ¶ 8 (emphasis added). 
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UNGA resolutions also call on member states to respect refugee rights57 and 
promote international cooperation.58 
In addition to U.N. General Assembly resolutions, the Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee (ExCom),59 
has continually underscored the importance of responsibility-sharing in 
implementing international refugee law. ExCom is comprised of representatives 
from 102 member states.60 These expert representatives are selected “on the 
widest possible geographical basis” and for their “demonstrated interest in, and 
devotion to, the solution of the refugee problem.”61 One of the Committee’s core 
functions is to “advise the High Commissioner” on refugee-related concerns,62 
which has manifested in a collection of ExCom Conclusions on international 
protection.63 While ExCom Conclusions are not binding, they are a rich source of 
soft law and have interpretive significance, both in analyzing and clarifying the 
meaning of international refugee law.64 ExCom has endorsed the principles of 
                                                 
57  For a discussion of these resolutions, see Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Language of Protection, 1 INT’L J. 
REFUGEE L. 6, 14–16 (1989). 
58  See, for example, G.A. Res. 70/1, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, art. 29 (Sept. 25, 2015), http://perma.cc/ST7Y-MPHV (“We will cooperate 
internationally to ensure safe, orderly and regular migration involving full respect for human rights 
and the humane treatment of migrants regardless of migration status, of refugees and of displaced 
persons.”); see also AGNÈS HURWITZ, THE COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES TO PROTECT 
REFUGEES 143 n.94 (2009) (listing UNGA resolutions discussing solidarity- and/or burden-sharing 
regarding refugee protection). 
59  UNHCR, The Executive Committee’s Origins and Mandate, http://perma.cc/QJ3V-6XPS (“The United 
Nations’ Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established the Executive Committee of the 
Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 1958 [Resolution 672 
(XXV)], and the governing body formally came into existence on 1 January 1959 . . . . Although 
established by ECOSOC, ExCom functions as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly.”). See 
generally ECOSOC, Res. 672 (XXV), Establishment of the Executive Committee of the Programme 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Apr. 30, 1958). 
60  UNHCR, ExCom Plenary Sessions: 2019 Executive Committee Session, http://perma.cc/7HPR-8LLU 
(last accessed Feb. 22, 2019). 
61  ECOSOC, supra note 59, at pmbl. 
62  G.A. Res. 116 (XII), § 5(b), International Assistance to Refugees within the Mandate of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Nov. 26, 1957) (“ECOSOC’s purpose is “[t]o advise 
the High Commissioner . . . in the exercise of his functions under the Statute of his Office.”). 
63  See UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusions on International Protection, http://perma.cc/9EPS-XF7R 
(“International protection is included as a priority theme on the agenda of each session of the 
Executive Committee.”). 
64  See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 112–13 (2005). 
This special status is accorded to ExCom’s conclusions because of its mandated advisory role, 
strengthened by its members’ expertise and consensus model of adopting conclusions. See 
Conclusions on International Protection, supra note 63. 
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burden- and responsibility-sharing in forty-three Conclusions since 1977.65 The 
Conclusions have recognized responsibility-sharing as a precursor for “ensuring 
access to protection . . .”66 and have reaffirmed the principle of international 
solidarity “as a primary condition for . . . the effective implementation of 
international protection.”67 Several Conclusions have further emphasized that in 
particular contexts, such as in cases of large-scale influx, states under pressure 
should receive immediate assistance from other states “in accordance with the 
principle of equitable burden-sharing,” including by ensuring that the burden of 
the first country of asylum is “equitably shared” among them.68 
                                                 
65  From 1977 to 2017, forty-three ExCom conclusions (both general and thematic) refer to either 
“international solidarity” and/or “burden-sharing” and/or “responsibility-sharing.” See, for example, 
UNHCR Exec. Comm., supra note 64; see generally UNHCR Exec. Comm, Conclusions on International 
Protection Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme 1975–2017 (Oct. 2017). A review 
of the ExCom conclusions reveals that the following conclusions refer to “international solidarity,” 
“burden-sharing” and/or “responsibility sharing:” No. 5 (1977), No. 11 (1978), No. 15 (1979), No. 
19 (1980), No. 22 (1981), No. 23 (1981), No. 33 (1984), No. 36 (1985), No. 48 (1987), No. 52 
(1988), No. 61 (1990), No. 62 (1990), No. 65 (1991), No. 67 (1991), No. 68 (1992), No. 71 (1993), 
No. 74 (1994), No. 77 (1995), No. 79 (1996), No. 80 (1996), No. 81 (1997), No. 82 (1997), No. 85 
(1998), No. 87 (1999), No. 89 (2000), No. 90 (2001), No. 93 (2002), No. 94 (2002), No. 95 (2003), 
No. 98 (2003), No. 99 (2004), No. 100 (2004), No. 102 (2005), No. 104 (2005), No. 105 (2006), No. 
107 (2007), No. 108 (2008), No. 109 (2009), No. 110 (2010), No. 111 (2013), No. 112 (2016), No. 
113 (2016), No. 114 (2017). 
66  UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 102, § (k) (2005), supra note 65, at 269. 
67  UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 11, § (e) (1978), supra note 65, at 25; see generally No. 
UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 52 (1988), supra note 65, at 105–06; UNHCR Exec. 
Comm., Conclusion No. 109 (2009), supra note 65, at 315–20; No. UNHCR Exec. Comm., 
Conclusion No. 110 (2010), supra note 65, at 321–24; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 112 
(2016), supra note 65, at 329–32; UNHCR Exec. Comm. Conclusion No. 114 (2017), supra note 65, 
at 337–39. 
68  UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 15, §§ (f)–(g) (1979), supra note 65, at 33–34; see also 
UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 19, § (b)(ii) (1980), supra note 65, at 42; UNHCR Exec. 
Comm., Conclusion No. 22, § (IV)(1–6) (1981), supra note 65, at 59; UNHCR Exec. Comm., 
Conclusion No. 61, § (g) (1992), supra note 65, at 126; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 67, 
§ (a) (1991), supra note 65, at 138; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 74, § (h) (1994), supra 
note 65, at 160; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 77, § (o) (1995), supra note 65, at 171; 
UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 79, §§ (h), (s) (1996), supra note 65, at 176, 178; UNHCR 
Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 81,§§ (j), (r) (1997), supra note 65, at 184, 186; UNHCR Exec. 
Comm., Conclusion No. 82, § (e) (1997), supra note 65, at 188; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion 
No. 85 §§ (o)–(p) (1998), supra note 65, at 197; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 90, § (f) 
(2001), supra note 65, at 213; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 93, § (c) (2002), supra note 
65, at 223; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 94, § (f) (2002), supra note 65, at 227; UNHCR 
Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 95, §§ (g)–(h) (2003), supra note 65, at 230; UNHCR Exec. Comm., 
Conclusion No. 99, § (e) (2004), supra note 65, at 248; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 100 
(2004), supra note 65, at 254; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 102, § (l) (2005), supra note 
65, at 269; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 104, § (r) (2005), supra note 65, at 284; UNHCR 
Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 108, § (m) (2008), supra note 65, at 312; see generally UNHCR Exec. 
Comm., Conclusion No. 87 (1999), supra note 65, at 203–07; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion 
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B. Contemporary Responsibil ity-Sharing in International 
Refugee Law: The Global Compacts 
The principle of international responsibility-sharing returned to center-stage 
with the U.N. General Assembly’s adoption of the New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants in October 2016,69 and two related Global Compacts in 
December 2018.70 UNGA member states convened in September 2016 to discuss 
solutions to the refugee crisis.71 U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized 
that this high-level meeting was an opportunity “to strengthen and implement 
existing frameworks” to deal with the current refugee crisis,72 and noted the 
“urgent need” to share the responsibility of protecting refugees to ensure that “the 
impact of their flight is not borne disproportionately by some countries and 
regions on the basis of their proximity to countries of origin alone.”73 The New 
York Declaration, which UNGA passed unanimously,74 was heralded as a 
“political commitment at the highest level, grounded in international cooperation 
and refugee protection standards.”75 The Declaration stressed that states have a 
“shared responsibility” to assist refugees and migrants.76 While the Declaration 
also acknowledged states’ rights to control their borders, it underscored that this 
right is not absolute, particularly when rejecting asylum seekers at the border 
would violate the non-refoulement obligation, which prohibits states from 
sending an individual to a place where s/he would risk facing serious harm.77 The 
                                                 
No. 89 (2000), supra note 65, at 209–11; UNHCR Exec. Comm., Conclusion No. 100 (2004), supra 
note 65, at 253–59. 
69  G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (Oct. 3, 2016). 
70  G.A. Res. 73/12 (Part II), Global Compact on Refugees (Aug. 2, 2018) [hereinafter Refugee 
Compact]; G.A. Res. 173/95, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. (Dec. 19, 
2018) [hereinafter Migration Compact]. 
71  See New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, supra note 69, at pmbl., ¶¶ 5–6 (“We, the 
Heads of State and Government . . . meeting . . . on 19 September 2016 to address the question of 
large movements of refugees and migrants . . . reaffirm the purposes and principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations . . . [and] the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recall the core 
international human rights treaties. . . . Though their treatment is governed by separate legal 
frameworks, refugees and migrants have the same universal human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”). 
72  U.N. Secretary-General, In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, ¶ 6, 
U.N. Doc. A/70/59 (Apr. 21, 2016).   
73  Id. at ¶ 68. The Secretary-General also affirmed that “responsibility-sharing stands at the core of 
the international protection regime.” Id. at ¶ 102(b). 
74  UNHCR, Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, http://perma.cc/ES8D-D2MF. 
75  Filippo Grandi, UNHCR, Opening Statement at the 69th Session of the Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Program (Oct. 1, 2018), http://perma.cc/YB77-65T3. 
76  Id.; see also New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, supra note 69, at ¶ 11. 
77  Id. at ¶ 24. 
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Declaration also called for the creation of two Global Compacts to further 
delineate state commitments.78 
Following the New York Declaration, development of the Global Compact 
on Refugees79 and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration80 
commenced. The UNHCR, in consultation with member states, NGOs, and 
international and regional organizations,81 developed the Refugee Compact, which 
UNGA adopted in December 2018.82 U.N. member states took the lead in 
drafting the Migration Compact, which the General Assembly also adopted in 
December 2018.83 The two Compacts are complementary84 but the Migration 
Compact is broader in scope, applying to all migrants—not only refugees. Both 
Compacts emphasize the importance of responsibility-sharing85 and international 
cooperation,86 yet they also give great deference to state sovereignty, allowing 
states to independently determine the extent and nature of their contributions.87 
                                                 
78  Id. at ¶ 21. 
79  Refugee Compact, supra note 70.  
80  Migration Compact, supra note 70. 
81  UNHCR, The Global Compact on Refugees – UNHCR Quick Guide 3–4, http://perma.cc/Y32B-6LYJ. 
Over 500 contributions were submitted by a variety of stakeholders. See UNHCR, Written 
Contributions, http://perma.cc/RT7Y-Y4GF.   
82  Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Endorses Landmark Global Compact on 
Refugees, Adopting 53 Third Committee Resolutions, 6 Decisions Covering Range of Human 
Rights, U.N. Press Release GA/12107 (Dec. 17, 2018), http://perma.cc/AB77-VWEP (reporting 
181 votes in favor, three abstentions—Eritrea, Liberia, and Libya—and two votes against the 
Compact—the U.S. and Hungary).   
83  Migration Compact, supra note 70, at 1; see also General Assembly Officially Adopts Roadmap for Migrants 
to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering, U.N. NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), http://perma.cc/8PU5-3WS5 (152 states 
voted in favor of the Migration Compact, while five states voted against the Compact: Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, and the U.S. Twelve members abstained and 24 were not present 
for voting.). 
84  See Migration Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 3 (“The two global compacts, together, present 
complementary international cooperation frameworks.”). 
85  See, for example, Refugee Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 1 (recognizing the “urgent need for more 
equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s 
refugees.”); id. at ¶¶ 14–48 (detailing arrangements for burden- and responsibility-sharing among 
states); see also Migration Compact, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 11, 14. 
86  See, for example, Migration Compact, supra note 70, at 6–7 (The Migration Compact includes a list of 
objectives, including “[s]trengthen[ing] international cooperation and global partnerships.”). The 
Migration Compact also includes “international cooperation” among its “interdependent guiding 
principles.” Id. at ¶ 15(b); see also Refugee Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 5 (naming “international 
solidarity” as one of the Compact’s guiding principles). 
87  Migration Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 15(c) (recognizing the “sovereign right of States to determine 
their national migration policy . . . taking into account different national realities, policies, 
priorities . . . in accordance with international law.”); see also Refugee Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 4 
(stating that states will determine their contributions “taking into account their national realities, 
capacities and levels of development, and respecting national policies and priorities.”).   
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Additionally, the Compacts are not legally binding,88 and thus depend on “mutual 
trust, determination and solidarity of States to fulfil the[se] objectives and 
commitments.”89 These are important limitations; however, both Compacts have 
normative value as representations of “the political will and ambition of the 
international community”90 and reaffirm the international principle of 
responsibility-sharing. 
This robust collection of international treaties, declarations, and soft law 
documents establishes and reaffirms the principle of responsibility-sharing in 
international refugee law. Unfortunately, none of these sources tackle the greatest 
source of consternation since the principle’s inception: What does responsibility-
sharing consist of? How should states divide this responsibility equitably?91 There is no 
binding, international mechanism that answers these questions. Responsibility-
sharing is demonstrated as a core tenet of international law by its inclusion in 
foundational international legal texts like the U.N. Charter, 1951 Refugee Protocol 
and its progeny, as well as modern attempts to announce the importance of this 
principle, like the New York Declaration and the Global Compacts. While 
mechanisms and modalities might not be clearly articulated, the principle is 
undeniable. Thus, certain actions, laws, and policies unequivocally violate its spirit 
and intent—like implementing systems that allocate regional responsibility for 
refugees based on place of entry, and constructing border barriers that prevent 
refugees from seeking asylum and shift refugee flows to neighboring states. 
III. THE DUBLIN REGULATION AND RESPONSIBILITY-
SHIFTING IN EUROPE 
The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed 
by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility.92 
Responsibility-sharing has featured prominently not only in international 
legal texts, but also in foundational E.U. texts. The Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU) explicitly states that “fair sharing of responsibility” 
                                                 
88  See Migration Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 15(b); Refugee Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 4. 
89  Migration Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 14. 
90  See, for example, Refugee Compact, supra note 70, at ¶ 4. 
91  For a discussion of potential responsibility-sharing criteria, see, for example, Tally Kritzman-Amir, 
Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in Refugee Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 355, 
372–75 (2009) (referencing political theorist David Miller and identifying absorption capacity, 
solidarity between states, and cultural and ethnic concerns as potential responsibility-sharing 
criteria). 
92  TFEU, supra note 31, at art. 80. 
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shall govern how the E.U. provides international protection to refugees.93 As such, 
while the binding nature of responsibility-sharing under international law might 
be debatable, in the E.U. it is unquestionably a binding legal norm. It is even more 
curious, then, that the E.U. created a system for determining responsibility for 
processing protection claims (and hosting those afforded protection)94 completely at 
odds with the principle of equitable sharing. This Section first presents a brief 
history of the Dublin Regulation, from the 1990 Dublin Convention to the current 
Dublin Regulation (recast). Next, it explains how Dublin determines state 
responsibility for asylum seekers, and how European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and European Court of Justice (CJEU) jurisprudence have influenced 
this calculus. It also assesses the realistic impact of those landmark decisions on 
responsibility-sharing and refugee protection. Finally, this Section critically 
analyzes how Dublin distorts responsibility-sharing by rendering Europe’s border 
states disproportionately responsible for asylum seekers. 
                                                 
93  Id. (“The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed 
by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. . . . Whenever necessary, the Union 
acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this 
principle.”); see also id. at art. 78(1) (mandating the creation of the Common European Asylum 
System). 
94  Dublin ultimately determines which member state is responsible for hosting the asylum seeker if 
she warrants international protection. See, for example, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council, Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal 
Avenues to Europe, at 3, COM (2016) 197 final (June 4, 2016), http://perma.cc/6UFD-ABU8 
(“[Dublin] establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is 
responsible for examining an application for international protection. Those who seek, or have been 
granted, protection do not have the right to choose in which Member State they want to settle.”); 
CATHRYN COSTELLO, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN EUROPEAN LAW 256 
(2016) (“The Dublin Regulation does not simply allocate responsibility for processing asylum 
claims, but in effect determines in which Member State the refugee will have to make her home.”). 
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A. From Convention to Regulation 
The Dublin system was first conceived of in the 1990s with the passage of 
the Schengen Implementing Convention95 and the Dublin Convention,96 which 
preceded the European Community’s Dublin Regulation (“Dublin II”)97 and the 
E.U.’s Dublin Regulation (recast) (“Dublin III”).98 The 1990s marked a change 
when states began to shrink their responsibilities to refugees, and the Dublin 
Convention is “one of the early manifestations” of this change.99 The Dublin 
Convention is “widely regarded as part of a retrenchment from generous asylum 
policies and acceptance of refugees in Europe.”100 Today, the Dublin system is 
comprised of the Dublin Regulation, which outlines the criteria for determining 
which member state is responsible for evaluating a particular asylum seeker’s 
protection claim, and the EURODAC Regulation,101 which facilitates the 
                                                 
95  Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of 
the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French 
Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, 1985 O.J. (L 239). 
Currently, 26 states belong to the Schengen Area, 22 of which are E.U. member states. See Schengen 
Area – The World’s Largest Visa Free Zone, SCHENGENVISAINFO, http://perma.cc/MJ8C-MHEK 
(listing the following Schengen countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
and Switzerland). Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Cyprus are slated to join the Schengen area but 
are not yet members. See id. 
96  Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in 
One of the Member States of the European Communities, 1997 O.J. (C 254) (June 15, 1990) 
(entered into force Sept. 1, 1997), [hereinafter Dublin Convention]. 
97  Council Regulation 343/2003 of 18 February 2003, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for 
Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application Lodged in One 
of the Member States by a Third-Country National, 2003 O.J. (L 50) (entered into force Mar. 17, 
2003) [hereinafter Dublin II].   
98  Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, Establishing 
the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible For Examining an 
Application For International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country 
National or a Stateless Person (recast), 2013 O.J. (L 180) (entered into force July 19, 2013) 
[hereinafter Dublin III]. 
99  Kathleen Newland & Demetrios G. Papdemetriou, Managing International Migration: Tracking the 
Emergence of a New International Regime, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 637, 642 (1998). 
100  Id. at 643. 
101  Council Regulation 603/2013 of 26 June 2013, Establishing Eurodac for the Comparison of 
Fingerprints for the Effective Application of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 180). 
Eurodac is intended to “facilitate the application of the Dublin Convention.” Id. at Recital 13. See 
also Dublin III, supra note 98, at ¶ 30. 
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administration of the Dublin Regulation by requiring member states to fingerprint 
asylum seekers where they enter Europe.102 
The Dublin Regulation is an integral component103 of the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS)104—part of the E.U.’s efforts to establish “an 
area of freedom, security and justice open to those who . . . legitimately seek 
protection in the Union.”105 The dissolution of internal E.U. borders with the 
passage of the Schengen Agreement106 influenced the development of the 
CEAS,107 which was intended to “limit the secondary movements of applicants 
for international protection between Member States”108 and to balance citizens 
                                                 
102  In addition to E.U. member states, these regulations also apply to the four European Free Trade 
Associates (EFTA) member states: Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland. See Council 
Decision 2001/258/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 93) 38 and Council Decision 2006/167/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 57) 
15 (Iceland and Norway); Council Decision 2008/149/JHA, 2008 O.J. (L 53) 50 (Switzerland); 
Council Decision 2011/351/EU, 2011 O.J. (L 160) 37 (Liechtenstein).  
103  See Dublin III, supra note 98, at Recital 7 (noting that “the Dublin system remains a cornerstone in 
building the CEAS” and citing the European Council’s Stockholm Programme); id. at Recital 9 
(“[A] well-functioning Dublin system is essential for the CEAS.”). 
104  CEAS is a collection of directives and regulations intended to harmonize how member states treat 
asylum seekers. These regional instruments include the: Asylum Procedures Directive, Reception 
Conditions Directive, Qualification Directive, Dublin Regulation, and EURODAC Regulation. See 
Migration and Home Affairs, Common European Asylum System, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://perma.cc/PA2T-4L5L. CEAS is “one of the most advanced regional protection 
frameworks,” but it is still an evolving “work in progress.” Eleni Karageorgiou & Vladislava 
Stoyanova, Introduction: Putting Asylum to the “European Refugee Crisis” Test, in THE NEW ASYLUM AND 
TRANSIT COUNTRIES IN EUROPE DURING AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2015/2016 CRISIS 3 
(Vladislava Stoyanova & Eleni Karageorgiou eds., 2019). When states join the E.U., they must 
accept the E.U. acquis, signing on to this collection of regional instruments. 
105  See Dublin III, supra note 98, at Recital 2. 
106  Schengen Acquis - Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic 
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of 
Checks at their Common Borders, 2000 O.J. (L 239) 13. 
107  For an overview of the development of the CEAS and its criticisms, see Vincent Chetail, The Common 
European Asylum System: Bric-à-brac or System, in REFORMING THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM 
SYSTEM: THE NEW EUROPEAN REFUGEE LAW 3–38 (Vincent Chetail et al. eds., 2016); Philippe De 
Bruycker & Evangilia (Lilian) Tsourdi, Building the Common European Asylum System beyond Legislative 
Harmonisation: Practical Cooperation, Solidarity and External Dimension, in REFORMING THE COMMON 
EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM: THE NEW EUROPEAN REFUGEE LAW 473–538 (Vincent Chetail et al. 
eds., 2016). 
108  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (Recast), 2013 O.J. 
(L 180) 60, Recital 13; see also Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 December 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless 
Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for 
Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted (Recast), 
2011 O.J. (L 337) 9, Recital 13; Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2013 Laying Down Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International 
Protection (Recast), 2013 O.J. (L 180) 97, Recital 12.  
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 352 Vol. 20 No. 2 
enjoying free movement throughout the Union with appropriate border 
protections to control immigration and police transnational crime.109 Under the 
TFEU, a responsibility-allocation mechanism—such as Dublin—is a legally 
required component of the CEAS.110 E.U. law also requires that the CEAS align 
with refugee law and human rights conventions—thus any related measures must 
respect refugee rights, including the principle of non-refoulement.111 
The Dublin system was intended to provide “a clear and workable method 
for determining the Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum 
application.”112 It was designed to prevent asylum-seeker forum shopping and 
multiple applications by the same person across member states,113 as well as 
“refugees in orbit”—where no member state accepts responsibility for an asylum 
seeker.114 Initially, the UNHCR commended the Dublin system as a solution to 
these problems.115 Almost a decade later, however, it acknowledged a major flaw 
                                                 
109  See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 3(2), Mar. 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 
17 (“The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal 
frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and 
combating of crime.”). 
110  TFEU, supra note 31, at art. 78(2)(3). 
111  See id. at art. 78(1) (“The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection 
and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national 
requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. 
This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol 
of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.”). 
112  Dublin III, supra note 98, at Recital 4 (referencing the Tampere Conclusions which noted CEAS 
would need such a system to be successful). 
113  See, for example, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria 
and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International 
Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National or Stateless Person (Recast), COM 
(2008) 820 final (Dec. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Examination Mechanism Proposal] (“In an area without 
controls at the internal borders of the Member States, a mechanism for determining responsibility 
for asylum applications lodged in the Member States was needed in order, on the one hand, to 
guarantee effective access to the procedures for determining refugee status and not to compromise 
the objective of the rapid processing of asylum applications and, on the other, to prevent abuse of 
asylum procedures in the form of multiple applications for asylum submitted by the same person 
in several Member States with the sole aim of extending his/her stay in the Member States.”). 
114  Dublin III, supra note 98, at Recital 5 (“It should, in particular, make it possible to determine rapidly 
the Member State responsible, so as to guarantee effective access to the procedures for granting 
international protection.”). See generally Fratzke, supra note 20; see also Anuscheh Farahat & Nora 
Markard, Forced Migration Governance: In Search of Sovereignty, 17 GERMAN L. J. 923, 933 (2016) (“[O]ne 
of the most important achievements of the Dublin system is that Member States can no longer 
unilaterally deny their responsibility.”). 
115  See, for example, UNHCR, Background Note on the Safe Country Concept and Refugee Status, ¶ 14, U.N. 
Doc. EC/SCP/68 (July 26, 1991) (noting that the Dublin Convention is a “positive development[] 
in this regard”). 
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in the system: Dublin’s responsibility-allocation criteria “place[] at a disadvantage 
countries bordering areas affected by refugee flows, and thus goes against the 
principles of responsibility-sharing and solidarity which are at the basis of the 
Union’s endeavours in the field of asylum.”116 Chief among Dublin’s criticisms is 
that responsibility for processing an asylum seeker’s application falls on the 
country of first entry—often at the E.U.’s southern and eastern borders.117 
B. Determining State Responsibil ity 
Under the current Dublin Regulation,118 state responsibility is determined 
through a hierarchy of criteria:119 (1) where the applicant has a family member 
legally present in a member state;120 (2) where the applicant has received a visa or 
residence document from a member state;121 (3) where the applicant illegally 
entered the E.U.;122 (4) where a member state has waived the need for the applicant 
to have a visa;123 or (5) where the applicant lodges a claim in an international transit 
area of an airport.124 If none of these criteria apply, the member state where the 
                                                 
116  Revisiting the Dublin Convention: Some Reflections by UNHCR in Response to the Commission Staff Working 
Paper, UNHCR at ¶ 4(v) (Jan., 19 2001), http://perma.cc/L2GE-K8YZ (“UNHCR considers it 
wholly inappropriate to derive any responsibility for considering an asylum application from the 
fact that the applicant has been merely present in the territory of a Member State. Mere presence in 
a territory is often the result of fortuitous circumstances, and does not necessarily imply the 
existence of any meaningful link or connection.”). 
117  See, for example, Maryellen Fullerton, Refugees and the Primacy of European Human Rights Law, 21 UCLA 
J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 45, 56 (2017) (“[T]he EU asylum system allows wealthier northern EU 
states to avoid determining asylum applications. As a result, these northern EU states send asylum 
seekers back to the poorer southern and eastern EU states, which are less equipped to manage large 
numbers of applicants.”); Madeline Garlick, The Dublin System, Solidarity and Individual Rights, in 
REFORMING THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM: THE NEW EUROPEAN REFUGEE LAW 
164–65 (Vincent Chetail et al. eds., 2016) (“Successive policy documents have made clear that ‘the 
Dublin system (Dublin and Eurodac Regulations) was not devised as a burden-sharing 
instrument.’”); Lillian M. Langford, The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under the Common European 
Asylum System and the Unraveling of E.U. Solidarity, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 217, 224, 238 (2013) (“[T]his 
rule has shifted a grossly disproportionate share of the burden for handling claims to the southern 
EU border states.”). 
118  For analysis of the original Dublin Regulation (Dublin II) compared to the recast version (Dublin 
III), see Steve Peers, The Second Phase of the Common European Asylum System – A Brave New World or 
Lipstick on a Pig? 220 STATEWATCH ANALYSIS 16 (2013) (“[A]s regards the Dublin rules in particular 
there have only been cosmetic changes to the previous objectionable legislation. This legislation in 
particular deserves the description of being merely ‘lipstick on a pig.’”). 
119  Dublin III, supra note 98, at art. 7. 
120  Id. at arts. 8–11. 
121  Id. at art. 12. 
122  Id. at art. 13. 
123  Id. at art. 14. 
124  Id. at art. 15. 
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applicant first lodged his/her asylum application is responsible for processing the 
claim.125 However, a state may elect not to transfer an applicant to the responsible 
state and process the claim itself,126 or it may request that another state take charge 
of the applicant on the basis of family reunification or humanitarian grounds, even 
where it would not otherwise be responsible under Dublin.127 These are known as 
Dublin’s discretionary clauses.128A state, however, may not transfer an applicant to an 
otherwise responsible state if it would expose him or her to “a risk of inhuman or 
degrading treatment,” given “systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the 
reception conditions for applicants” in that state.129 In such a case, the state where 
the asylum seeker is currently located is responsible for examining the protection 
claim if no other member state is deemed responsible.130 
This exception to the Dublin criteria, codified for the first time in Dublin 
III, stems from ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence. These courts have held that a 
member state’s ability to transfer an asylum seeker under the Dublin Regulation 
is not absolute where implementing a transfer would violate the state’s non-
refoulement obligation. The TFEU,131 the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (CFR),132 and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)133 all prohibit refoulement—sending persons to a country where they 
                                                 
125  Id. at art 3. 
126  Id. at art. 17(1). 
127  Id. at art. 17(2). 
128  See, for example, Silvia Morgades-Gil, The Discretion of States in the Dublin III System for Determining 
Responsibility for Examining Applications for Asylum, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 433 (2015). 
129  Dublin III, supra note 98, at art. 3(2).  
130  Id.  
131  TFEU, supra note 31, at art. 78(1) (requiring that E.U. law on asylum comply with the principle of 
non-refoulement). 
132  Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 18-19, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391 
(announcing in Article 18 a “right to asylum” and prohibiting in Article 19 refoulement and 
collective expulsion).   
133  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; see also Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 4, Sept. 16, 1963, E.T.S No. 46 (“Collective 
expulsion of aliens is prohibited.”). The ECHR, under Article 3, prohibits subjecting an individual 
to “torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” which the ECtHR has 
interpreted to prohibit refoulement. See, for example, T.I. v. United Kingdom, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 
14 (2000) ([“T]he fundamentally important prohibition against torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3 . . . imposes an obligation on Contracting States not to expel a person to 
a country where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he would face a real risk 
of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3.”); see also Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 97, ¶ 114 (2012); Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, App. No. 47287/15, Eur. Ct. H.R. 35, ¶ 112 
(2017) (“Article 3 implies an obligation not to deport” where there is a real risk of the applicant 
being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the destination country.). 
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would face serious harm. In its 2011 landmark ruling, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece,134 
the ECtHR held that the member state effecting a transfer can be held responsible 
if the destination state exposes the asylum seeker to treatment in violation of 
ECHR Art. 3.135 Similarly, the CJEU, in joined cases N.S. v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department and M.E., A.S.M., M.T., K.P, E.H. v. Refugee Applications 
Commission, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform held that if “systemic 
deficiencies”136 in either the destination state’s asylum system or reception 
conditions give the current host state “substantial grounds for believing that the 
asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading 
treatment,” then the presumption of safety regarding the destination state is 
rebuttable, and a Dublin transfer to that state would violate CFR Art. 4.137 
Some scholars have argued that CJEU and ECtHR jurisprudence have 
resulted in de facto responsibility-sharing,138 while others claim that human rights 
                                                 
134  M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255, ¶¶ 233, 360 (2011) (holding that both 
detention and living conditions in Greece violated ECHR Article 3, and that Belgium also violated 
Article 3 by exposing applicants to these conditions). Additionally, the Court found that Greece 
and Belgium violated ECHR Article 13—the former for its inadequate asylum procedures, and the 
latter for not providing an adequate procedure to appeal transfer to Greece. Id. at ¶¶ 321, 396. 
135  Id. at ¶ 321 (holding transfer of an asylum seeker by Belgium to Greece under the Dublin 
Regulations violated international and European human rights obligations where Greece did not 
provide access to an effective remedy thus exposing the asylum seeker to the risk of refoulement). 
In Tarakhel v. Switzerland, the Court reaffirmed this general holding, concluding that a member state 
would be liable where it returned an asylum seeker under Dublin without first obtaining guarantees 
that the receiving state would not subject the applicant to torture or inhuman and/or degrading 
treatment. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, 2014-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, 223 (2014) (holding transfer of 
applicants to Italy without Swiss authorities first obtaining individual guarantees that Italy would 
appropriate handle the minor applicants’ claims and not separate the family violates ECHR Article 
3). 
136  Some scholars have criticized the NS/ME decision for requiring “systemic breach” to give rise to 
an Art. 4 CFR violation, which is a heightened threshold compared to the ECtHR’s ruling in MSS 
v. Belgium and Greece. See, for example, COSTELLO, supra note 94, at 273. 
137  Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N. S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2011 E.C.R. I-
13991, I-14027, ¶¶ 105–06 (“European Union law precludes the application of a conclusive 
presumption that the Member State which Article 3(1) of Regulation No 343/2003 indicates as 
responsible observes the fundamental rights of the European Union. Article 4 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that the Member 
States, including the national courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker to the ‘Member State 
responsible’ within the meaning of Regulation No 343/2003 where they cannot be unaware that 
systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in 
that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face 
a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of that 
provision.”). 
138  Paulo Biondi, Compliance with Fundamental Rights Demands Shared Responsibility, in THE NEW ASYLUM 
AND TRANSIT COUNTRIES IN EUROPE DURING AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2015/2016 CRISIS 
263, 275 (Vladislava Stoyanova & Eleni Karageorgiou eds., 2019) (arguing that Dublin III articles 
3(2) and 17 are “compulsory derogations [that] can be considered a form of responsibility-sharing”). 
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courts have encouraged states to construct border walls as a means of immigration 
control.139 Both assertions are not fully satisfying. On the former assertion, to label 
the outcome of these decisions “de facto responsibility-sharing” is an overgenerous 
description of their impact. CJEU and ECtHR have stepped in to rectify a wrong 
caused by Dublin’s shortcomings. This is not true responsibility-sharing, where 
states uphold their duty to equitably handle refugee flows. It is an ad hoc, remedial 
attempt at honoring human rights where Dublin’s assumption of “similarity 
between protection standards, procedures, and most importantly outcomes that 
simply does not exist.”140 Not only is this judicial fix reactive, it places the onus 
on asylum seekers to vindicate their rights on a case-by-case basis.141 This is 
particularly problematic when both the ECtHR and CJEU are experiencing 
serious backlogs.142 There are also serious concomitant negative externalities to 
relying on courts to clean up Dublin’s mess. The current system rewards states for 
“systemic flaws,” inadequate reception conditions, and blatant human rights 
violations, allowing them to avoid responsibility under the Dublin regime. 
Regarding the latter assertion, from a human rights perspective, courts should be 
making rights-responsive decisions to protect asylees from being refouled. 
Claiming that human rights court and quasi-judicial decisions influence the 
construction of walls ignores the role that Dublin plays in this phenomenon. 
Dublin renders border states disproportionally responsible for processing asylum 
seekers, encouraging these states to fortify their borders to prevent entry. As 
European border states erect physical and legal barriers, refugee flows shift to 
neighboring states who are then incentivized to erect border barriers of their own 
to avoid responsibility. The line of human rights jurisprudence in Europe is rights-
responsive, grounded in respect for the human rights of asylum seekers and the 
principle of non-refoulement. It is the underlying systemic issue, created by 
Dublin, that must be resolved. 
                                                 
139  Paz, The Law of Walls, supra note 19, at 602 (“My claim is that human rights courts and quasi-judicial 
bodies have made border walls an attractive strategic solution for states that seek to regain their 
traditional control over immigration.”). 
140  COSTELLO, supra note 94, at 257. 
141  See, for example, Fullerton, Asylum Crisis Italian Style, supra note 20, at 57 (“[ECtHR precedent] also 
creates perverse incentives for member states to respond to the Dublin Regulation proceedings by 
offering individualized relief to respondents rather than remedying system-wide deficits.”); see also 
id. at 133 (“The Tarakhel judgement will lead to amplified efforts to negotiate individualized 
guarantees to protect specific asylum seekers subject to transfer requests. This approach is likely to 
undermine efforts to repair and improve unsatisfactory reception conditions.”). 
142  For example, heading into 2015, the ECtHR had a backlog of 69,900 cases. COSTELLO, supra note 
94, at 324. Furthermore, “most cases submitted are deemed inadmissible.” Id. (“CJEU too is 
overburdened.”). 
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C. Shifting Responsibil ity 
The Dublin Regulation criteria primarily place responsibility on the member 
state responsible for allowing the applicant to enter the E.U.,143 and the most 
common criterion cited for transfer requests is “illegal entry.”144 Illegal entry is 
often the only manner in which an asylum seeker can access Europe.145 As such, 
under Dublin, responsibility is often predicated upon proximity to refugee 
hotspots—which has the greatest impact on southern and eastern E.U. border 
states. This corrupts a critical underpinning of the refugee protection regime: 
“Under the 1951 [Refugee] Convention . . . refugees are the responsibility of the 
world . . . . Proximity doesn’t define responsibility.”146 The recent refugee crisis 
fully exposed this pressure point, demonstrating Dublin’s unworkable nature. 
During the height of the crisis in 2015, over one million refugees applied for 
protection in Europe.147 Even before the 2015 spike, the ECtHR noted that E.U. 
border states face “considerable difficulties in coping with the increasing influx of 
migrants and asylum seekers.”148 While the Dublin Regulation sought to identify 
the member state responsible for processing an asylum application, it did not put 
any form of meaningful support in place for states receiving disproportionate 
numbers of applicants. Dublin III merely included a “mechanism for early 
warning, preparedness and crisis management,” where a member state under 
pressure would be “invit[ed] . . . to draw up a preventive action plan.”149 Under 
the mechanism, member states were left to “take all appropriate measures to deal 
                                                 
143  See, for example, Examination Mechanism Proposal, supra note 113, at 3 (“[T]he responsibility for 
examining an application should primarily lie with the Member State which played the greatest part 
in the applicant’s entry into and residence in the territories of the Member States, with some 
exceptions designed to protect family unity.”). 
144  Migration and Home Affairs, The Dublin System, EUR. COMM’N, http://perma.cc/7T5S-5CVF. 
“Illegal entry” is not a crime—asylum seekers may enter a state irregularly, as long as they swiftly 
indicate their intention to seek protection. 1951 Convention, supra note 34, at art. 31(1). 
145  See, for example, FITZGERALD, supra note 29, at 160 (“With very few legal routes, an estimated nine 
out of ten asylum seekers enter [Europe] without visas.”); VIOLETA MORENO-LAX, ACCESSING 
ASYLUM IN EUROPE: EXTRATERRITORIAL BORDER CONTROLS AND REFUGEE RIGHTS UNDER E.U. 
LAW 466 (2017).  
146  Interview by U.N. News Centre with Peter Sutherland, U.N. Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for International Migration (Oct. 2, 2015), http://perma.cc/ME43-59GK 
(affirming that North African refugees are not just Europe’s responsibility; however, the principle 
is applicable in the Dublin context, where the state of entry (by virtue of proximity) is held 
responsible for processing asylum applications). 
147  See Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015, PEW RESEARCH (Aug. 2, 2016), 
http://perma.cc/7P6W-C8UC (“A record 1.3 million migrants applied for asylum in the 28 
member states of the European Union, Norway and Switzerland in 2015.”). 
148  Hirsi Jamaa, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 122 (citing M.S.S., 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 223). 
149  Dublin III, supra note 98, at art. 33(1). 
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with the situation of particular pressure on its asylum system or to ensure that the 
deficiencies identified are addressed before the situation deteriorates.”150 This 
voluntary mechanism was “destined to be ineffectual”151 and left the E.U. to 
(unsuccessfully) employ remedial ad hoc efforts to redistribute asylum seekers from 
overburdened states—like the temporary 2015 relocation quota scheme.152 As of 
fall 2018, only 34,705 asylum seekers out of the agreed-upon 160,000153 had been 




                                                 
150  Id. at art. 33(2). 
151  Fullerton, Asylum Crisis Italian Style, supra note 20, at 125–26 (discussing Dublin III’s new early 
warning system and the Commission’s proposed temporary suspension mechanism for states under 
pressure which “did not survive political negotiations”). 
152  For an examination of the failure to implement this quota-based relocation mechanism, see 
Fullerton, Borders, Bans, and Courts, supra note 28, at 406–18; Farahat & Markard, supra note 114, at 
934–37. 
153  On Sept. 14, 2015, the Council voted to relocate 40,000 asylum seekers from Italy and Greece. On 
Sept. 22, 2015, the Council agreed to relocate an additional 120,000 asylum seekers from Greece 
and Italy. See General Secretariat of the Council, Resolution of the Representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States Meeting within the Council on Relocating from Greece and 
Italy 40,000 Persons in Clear Need of International Protection, Council of the European Union 
(2015), http://perma.cc/PL22-JK94; Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 
Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of International Protection for the Benefit of Italy 
and Greece, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80, http://perma.cc/6AW4-7NLY [hereinafter 2015 Quota 
Scheme]. 
154  Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Oct. 30, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/Q6MA-2D5Y. The calculation for the distribution key includes population size, 
GDP, the average number of asylum applications, and the unemployment rate of the host country. 
See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council Establishing a Crisis Relocation 
Mechanism and Amending Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining a Member State Responsible for 
Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third Country 
National or a Stateless Person, at 10, COM (2015) 450 final (Sept. 9, 2015), http://perma.cc/WKF2-
DGPW (“a) Population – 40% weighting; b) Total GDP – 40% weighting; c) Average number of 
asylum applications over the 5 preceding years per million inhabitants with a cap of 30% of the 
population and GDP – 10% weighting; d) Unemployment rate with a cap of 30% of the population 
and GDP – 10% weighting”). 
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IV. THE PROLIFERATION OF BORDER BARRIERS IN  
FORTRESS EUROPE 
[I]nstead of a Europe without borders, [we] got a Europe with an iron curtain once 
again.155 
Even before the recent refugee crisis brought an unprecedented number of 
arrivals to Europe’s shores, border states voiced concerns about the additional 
burdens they faced under Dublin’s responsibility-allocation criteria.156 The 
European Commission also acknowledged this shortcoming in its evaluation of 
the Dublin system,157 particularly as it might affect border states during periods of 
large-scale influx.158 The 2015 refugee crisis crystalized Dublin’s failures, 
demonstrating its unworkability and precipitating a surge in the construction of 
border walls and fences throughout Europe. This Section first explains 2015’s 
refugee flows and how European states responded. Next, it discusses how 
Dublin’s “irregular entry” criterion has impacted states, both physically and 
psychologically, and the theory behind the desire to construct walls. Then, this 
Section evaluates Europe’s Fortress, including the human rights and security 
concerns it has posed. Finally, the Section analyzes how states use “legal walls” to 
buttress the physical Fortress. 
A. Responding to 2015’s Refugee Flows 
In 2015, 1,032,408 people arrived in Europe.159 Many of these individuals 
had legitimate protection concerns, with 84 percent hailing from “the world’s top 
10 refugee producing countries.”160 Two frontline European countries 
                                                 
155  DACIC: Countermeasures If E.U. Does Not Solve Crisis, MIN. OF FOREIGN AFF’S REPUBLIC OF SERBIA 
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://perma.cc/SZ7F-SN2K (Statement of Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic). 
156  See generally Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Cyprus et al., Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta 
Paper (Jan. 13, 2009), http://perma.cc/PL8L-XMBY (discussing the need for fair burden-sharing 
and solidarity, noting that the Dublin Criteria result in “added burden on frontline member states.”). 
157  DG MIGRATION AND HOME AFFAIRS, supra note 20, at 11 (“The hierarchy of criteria for the 
allocation of responsibility does not take into account the Member States’ capacity to provide 
protection and was not designed to distribute responsibility evenly. On the contrary, the criteria 
may even have exacerbated imbalances between Member States.”). 
158  Id. 
159  U.N. High Comm’r Human Rights, Operational Portal Refugee Situations: Mediterranean Situation, 
UNHCR, http://perma.cc/N8QZ-2462 (last updated Oct. 28, 2019) (“Arrivals include sea arrivals 
to Italy, Cyprus and Malta and both sea and land arrivals to Greece and Spain.”). 
160  Jonathan Clayton & Hereward Holland, Over One Million Sea Arrivals Reach Europe in 2015, U.N. 
High Comm’r Human Rights (Dec. 30, 2015), http://perma.cc/Z5ZB-7JD9. 
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experienced the lion’s share of arrivals: Greece received 861,630,161 and Italy 
received 153,842.162 If the Dublin system were operating perfectly, under the 
irregular entry criterion Greece and Italy would have been responsible for 
processing protection claims for all of these individuals (and hosting them). 
Dublin, in its truest form, would have resulted in an incredibly disproportionate 
burden on these two states. Thus, Italy and Greece were incentivized to evade 
Dublin’s reach. 
One effective strategy for dealing with this large group of arrivals was simply 
not to fingerprint them,163 employed by either necessity (because these states did 
not have the capacity to handle such refugee flows)164 or choice (because it would 
mean that other European states could not definitively prove where the asylum 
seeker had entered Europe). Waving people through without fingerprinting 
enabled protection seekers to continue onward, deeper into Europe.165 Another 
equally effective strategy was to maintain an asylum system with “systemic 
deficiencies” (again, either by necessity or choice) so that other states could not 
legally perform Dublin transfers to return asylum seekers.166 
Reported asylum application figures for Italy and Greece in 2015 
demonstrate that there were indeed a large number of protection seekers who 
engaged in secondary movements. Greece only reported 17,211 asylum applicants 
                                                 
161  Of 861,630 refugees, 856,723 arrived by sea. Operational Portal Situations: Mediterranean Situation – 
Greece, U.N. High Comm’r Human Rights, http://perma.cc/3EZJ-SJ7G (last updated Oct. 27, 
2019). 
162  Operational Portal Situations: Mediterranean Situation – Italy, U.N. High Comm’r Human Rights, 
http://perma.cc/736A-53GT (last updated Oct. 28, 2019). 
163  See, for example, Maiani, supra note 20, at 111 (discussing Italy’s failure to fingerprint arrivals during 
its Mare Nostrum operation, and citing accusations by other E.U. member states against Italy. “[I]n 
light of the skewed bargain underlying the Dublin criteria, [border states failing to fingerprint 
arrivals] is also an entirely predictable violation.”); see also Barbie Latza Nadeau, Italy’s Latest Export 
Is Refugees, and the Rest of Europe Is Not Happy, THE DAILY BEAST, http://perma.cc/J3YB-MM22 (last 
updated Apr. 14, 2017) (quoting Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann: “Italy in many cases 
intentionally does not take personal data and fingerprints from refugees to enable them to seek 
asylum in another country.”). 
164  During Europe’s “refugee crisis,” at least one country explicitly asked the European Commission 
whether they could legally “wave people through” given the high volume of arrivals. See Elizabeth 
Collett & Camille Le Coz, After the Storm: Learning from the E.U. Response to the Migration Crisis,  
MIGRATION POLICY INST. EUR. 15 (2018) (discussing an interview with an anonymous diplomat 
whose question went unanswered by the Commission). 
165  A practice that upset other European states. See, for example, Florian Eder & Vassili Golod, Austria’s 
Kurz: Close E.U.’s External Borders, Not Internal Frontiers, POLITICO (Apr. 19, 2019), 
http://perma.cc/PC23-VAEC (“[Austrian Chancellor, Sebastian] Kurz acknowledged that it was 
‘important to make progress’ on migration . . . . ‘For years I have said: the practice of waving people 
through to the center of Europe must stop’ . . . . [T]he focus should be on ‘proper external border 
protection.’”). 
166  See supra Section III (discussing M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece and related cases). 
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that year.167 Similarly, Italy also received only a portion of asylum applicants 
compared to arrivals.168 And, while this data captures how many individuals applied, 
it does not account for those who applied and absconded, fleeing deeper into 
Europe. Thus, other European countries became the new “frontline” for arrivals. 
In 2015, Hungary received over 400,000 arrivals.169 These protection seekers170 
likely traveled on the Balkan (or Eastern Mediterranean) route, initially entering 
the E.U. irregularly in Greece before arriving in Hungary via Serbia.171 While 
Hungary has been characterized as a transit state, rather than a destination for 
refugees, it initially blocked individuals who wished to leave for Austria, trapping 
them in Hungary.172 That year, Hungary received the largest number of applicants 
per capita173 and the second-highest number of asylum applications in absolute 
terms in the E.U.—177,340.174 Hungary was not able to transfer these asylum 
seekers back to Greece under ECtHR and CJEU jurisprudence.175 To mitigate this 
issue, Hungary constructed fences at its borders with Serbia176 and Croatia177—an 
easy “fix” to block entries altogether.178 Shortly after Hungary closed its borders, 
                                                 
167  2015 U.N.H.C.R. Stat. Y.B. 51. 
168  Italy received 83,243 asylum applications. Id.  
169  Migration Issues in Hungary, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, http://perma.cc/4N66-XSVA (last 
updated June 29, 2018) (reporting that 441,515 people irregularly entered Hungary in 2015, most 
of whom were refugees fleeing war in their home countries). 
170  Migration Flow to Hungary: 2016 Overview, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (July 6, 2017), 
http://perma.cc/9T45-4X75 (“Three out of four migrants left their country of origin because of 
war/conflict or political reasons.”). 
171  Migrants traveled through Turkey to Greece via “the eastern Mediterranean route” and then often 
continued onward through North Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, and Austria via “the western Balkan 
route.” After Austria, they would either head for Germany or Sweden. See FITZGERALD, REFUGE 
BEYOND REACH, supra note 29, at 210. 
172  See Anemona Hartocollis, Traveling in Europe’s River of Migrants: Budapest’s Keleti Train Station Has 
Become a de Facto Refugee Camp, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2015), http://perma.cc/VMP6-NUQF. 
173  See Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015, supra note 147 (noting that Hungary 
received 1,770 first-time applicants per 100,000 Hungarian citizens). 
174  2015 U.N.H.C.R. Stat. Y.B. 51. 
175  See supra Section III, at note 134 (discussing M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece). 
176  See Hungary: New Border Regime Threatens Asylum Seekers, supra note 11. 
177  See Migrant Crisis: Hungary Closes Border with Croatia, supra note 12. Hungary also contemplated 
erecting a wall on its border with Romania. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Europe’s Refugee 
Emergency Response - Update #3 (Sept. 24, 2015), http://perma.cc/VX26-9VU2; but see We Would 
Rather Help Romania Protect Its Eastern Border Than Build a Fence Along the Hungarian-Romanian Border, 
MAGYAR TÁVIRATI IRODA (Oct. 4, 2017), http://perma.cc/7BUM-7EQD.   
178  Hungary began erecting border walls and legal barriers during the height of the 2015 refugee crisis 
to exclude asylum seekers. See Armstrong, supra note 6. 
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other states followed suit as migrant flows were diverted to their territory.179 In 
this way, the Dublin system created an incentive to build fences and other barriers 
so that states could avoid becoming responsible for asylum seekers irregularly 
entering their countries. It was a predictable way to exclude persons seeking entry, 
rather than relying on a broken responsibility-allocation system. 
B. Understanding the Fortress 
The role that the Dublin system’s “irregular entry” criterion has played in 
assigning responsibility has had a palpable impact on member states—both 
physically and psychologically. This criterion, and how it has manifested in 
overburdened European border countries during the 2015 crisis, encouraged 
states to implement barriers to prevent refugees from entering—both physical 
obstacles (like walls and fences) and legal barriers (like inappropriate use of the 
safe third country concept and push-backs at the border). And yet, this is 
essentially what Dublin was intended to do. As the European Commission has 
acknowledged, the irregular entry criterion was meant to encourage border states 
to protect the external E.U. border after Schengen removed internal border 
controls.180 This fortress mentality, however, has kicked into overdrive, 
prohibiting genuine asylum seekers from accessing protection.181 Dublin’s 
“irregular entry” criterion also appears to have affected the psychology of how 
European states view their responsibility to refugees. Regarding whether Austria 
would open a center to process asylum claims, Chancellor Sebastian Kurz balked, 
“Of course not . . . we are not a first arrival country, unless people jump with 
parachutes.”182 As another contemporary example, Slovakia and Hungary went so 
                                                 
179  For example, in summer 2016, Croatia finalized construction of a fence on its border with Serbia 
to block diverted migrant flows. See Milekic, supra note 16. Other walls and fences built in 2015 
include North Macedonia’s fence on its border with Greece, Slovenia’s fence on its border with 
Croatia, and Austria’s fence on its border with Slovenia. See Sullivan, supra note 2; China Global 
Television Network, supra note 4. 
180  “Reliance on this criterion [irregular entry] was based on the assumption that a linkage should be 
made between the allocation of responsibility in the field of asylum and the respect by Member 
States of their obligations in terms of protection of the external border.” Communication from the 
Commission, supra note 94.  
181  See, for example, If There Were No Fence, Tens of Thousands of Migrants Would Be Arriving in Hungary Each 
Year, KORMANY (Mar. 17, 2018), http://perma.cc/3VE4-UF4P (quoting Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán: “This fence not only protects Hungary, but all of Europe.”). 
182  Jennifer Rankin & Daniel Boffey, EU Leaders Defend Migration Deal as Doubts Emerge, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 29, 2018), http://perma.cc/7DF8-QXR4. Other states, including France and Germany, also 
refused to open processing centers to assess protection claims. See id. (“EU leaders ended 10 hours 
of fraught talks on migration with a vague accord to set up ‘controlled centres’” in Europe to assess 
asylum claims of people rescued in the Mediterranean. . . . But Austria, France, Germany and Italy 
made clear they had no immediate plans to open secure centres on their soil.”). 
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far as to sue the European Union to avoid a shift in responsibility from what 
Dublin prescribed.183 
In addition to Dublin’s physical and psychological impact on European 
states, explanations for the proliferation of border walls in Europe span both the 
political and the legal. Political scientist Wendy Brown contends that walls are 
both an act of the sovereign state, who legitimizes their construction in the name 
of sovereignty, and also a marker of “eroding state sovereignty” in an ever-
globalizing world.184 In effect, “[walls] establish something of an ‘us’ and a ‘them’ 
and [state] capacity to take control of situations.”185 While Brown acknowledges 
that states are still critical “global actors,” particularly noting their importance as 
conduits for the assertion and realization of human rights,186 she also recognizes 
their relative demise in the post-Westphalian world. States are responding to the 
conflict of “postnational and international assertions of law, rights and authority” 
by erecting walls.187 The proliferation of walls, and legal barriers prohibiting entry, 
also logically tracks with the resurgence of populist nationalism in Western 
democracies throughout Europe—whether such barriers are justified by political 
leaders as cultural or economic preservation, or as a strategy to garner votes188 and 
consolidate power by harnessing the electorate’s discontent with the realities of 
                                                 
183  Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the European 
Union, 2016 O.J. (L 38) 4 (Sept. 6, 2017) (Hungary and Slovakia sought the annulment of the 
Council’s “Relocation Decision” to benefit Italy and Greece. The Court of Justice of the European 
Union ultimately threw out the case.). 
184  WENDY BROWN, WALLED STATES, WANING SOVEREIGNTY 25 (2010) (“[Walls are constructed] As 
responses to contested and eroding state sovereignty, the new walls project an image of sovereign 
jurisdictional power and an aura of the bounded and secure nation. . . .”). See also id. at 32 (“Most 
walls continue to draw on the idea of nation-state sovereignty for their legitimacy and serve 
performatively to shore up nation-state sovereignty even as these barriers . . . are themselves 
sometimes monuments to the fading strength or importance of nation-state sovereignty.”). 
185  Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, Beyond the Wall: A Q&A with Wendy Brown, THE NATION (Jan. 9, 2019), 
http://perma.cc/QS2J-64HK.  
186  “[States are] emblem[atic] of political belonging and political protection. The plight of refugees and 
other stateless peoples is a reminder of the extent to which states remain the only meaningful sites 
of political citizenship and rights guarantees, as well as the most during emblems of security.” 
BROWN, supra note 184, at 68. See also HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 177 
(Schocken Books, 3rd ed. 1968) (defining citizenship as the “right to have rights”). 
187  Brown, supra note 184, at 22 (“Nation-state sovereignty has been challenged by a quarter century of 
postnational and international assertions of law, rights, and authority that sometimes openly aim to 
subvert or supersede the sovereignty of states.”). 
188  Nahlah Ayed, Walled World: Lessons from Europe’s Border Barriers, CBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2019), 
http://perma.cc/2WBV-5577 (“[B]order barriers have proven popular both among ordinary 
Europeans and the politicians looking to win their vote. . . . The fence, and Orban’s views on 
immigration, are popular. He recently won a third term as the country’s prime minister.”). 
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globalization.189 In an era of increasingly politicized racism, discrimination, and 
xenophobia, states are making it ever-more challenging for refugees to seek 
asylum: “Responsibility-sharing has been replaced by responsibility-shedding.”190 
As governments make their own borders more difficult to cross, other states 
follow suit to avoid the resulting influx of refugees who can no longer access their 
neighbors.191 
C. Evaluating the Fortress 
Evaluating the efficacy of border barriers is challenging; it is not easy to 
separate the effect of the walls from the influence of other laws and policies 
affecting migration routes. However, one clear observation is that walls and fences 
encourage a shifting of entry points, leading additional states to erect similar 
barriers. For example, the barrier that Greece constructed on its border with 
Turkey in 2012 precipitated an increase of migrants who then tried to enter 
Europe at Bulgaria’s border with Turkey.192 This promptly encouraged Bulgaria to 
erect a fence of its own.193 Similarly, Hungary’s closure of its borders in fall 2015 
resulted in Slovenia becoming the primary entry point for migrants traveling on 
the Balkan route.194 Slovenia then built a wall.195 This domino effect has penetrated 
further into E.U. territory, triggering member states including France, Germany, 
Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden to reinstate border controls in the once-
open Schengen area196 and, in some cases, to construct physical barriers of their 
                                                 
189  See, for example, Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al., The Future of Migration Policy in a Volatile Political 
Landscape, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Nov. 2018); Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al., In Search of a 
New Equilibrium: Immigration Policymaking in the Newest Era of Nativist Populism, MIGRATION POLICY 
INST. (Nov. 2018). 
190  Grandi, supra note 75. 
191  Newland & Papdemetriou, supra note 99, at 637. 
192  Amnesty Int’l, The Human Cost of Fortress Europe: Human Rights Violations Against Migrants and Refugees 
at Europe’s Borders (July 9, 2014), http://perma.cc/W5H5-FCXG.  
193  Id. 
194  Strained Slovenia Weighs Border Fence of Its Own, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 23, 2015), 
http://perma.cc/3V9F-3DYE. 
195  See Surk, supra note 14. 
196  See Border Checks Are Undermining Schengen, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 25, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/7H6Z-TYHP (“[S]ince the refugee crisis of 2015, “temporary” border controls 
have become more or less permanent in [these] six European countries.”); see also Sergio Carrera et 
al., Analysis of Schengen State Notifications on the Reintroduction of Border Controls at the Internal Borders of the 
Schengen Area (Updated), September 2015 - December 2017 Annex 3, in THE FUTURE OF THE SCHENGEN 
AREA: LATEST DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES IN THE SCHENGEN GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
SINCE 2016 62, http://perma.cc/9R5X-H5YR (noting that Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden reinstituted internal border controls). 
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own.197 Not only do these barriers violate a refugee’s right to seek asylum, but 
Schengen’s evisceration jeopardizes one of the most valued characteristics of the 
Union—“the free movement of people, goods and services” within it.198 
Critics have also rebuked Fortress Europe for the human and security costs 
it imposes.199 Some argue that asylum seekers are not necessarily dissuaded by 
walls; they are simply compelled to find another way to Europe—typically a more 
“dangerous route[]”200 as safer options for entry dwindle. In this vein, critics have 
derided walls as “spectacularly expensive political gestures” that do not necessarily 
stop border crossings, but simply make them “longer, more expensive, and 
harrowing . . . .”201 At least initially, that argument comported with the data: there 
were 1,204,280 first-time asylum applications lodged in Europe in 2016,202 
comparable to 2015’s 1,255,640 applications.203 Forcing people to take covert 
routes creates problems from a security standpoint, as governments then have less 
visibility to monitor (and control) who is entering the country. It also has resulted 
in systemic violations of human rights and refugee law. Alternative pathways have 
often meant travel by sea, and have resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of 
migrants.204  
                                                 
197  See, for example, Austria Begins Erecting Fence on Border with Slovenia, supra note 15. 
198  See, for example, European Comm’n, Standard Eurobarometer 83, 31 (July 2015), 
http://perma.cc/8MLR-FDL3 (57 percent of respondents identified “free movement of people, 
goods and services” as the “most positive result[] of the EU in the eyes of Europeans.”). 
199  See, for example, Caitlin, Katsiaficas, Asylum Seeker and Migrant Flows in the Mediterranean Adapt Rapidly 
to Changing Conditions, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (June 22, 2016), http://perma.cc/V35Q-8VHY 
(“Rather than deterring migration altogether, early evidence suggests increased enforcement of land 
borders has frequently served to increase maritime migration, with flows adapting to changing 
enforcement conditions. Maritime migration is both more dangerous for those migrating—who 
frequently turn to smugglers for assistance—and more difficult for policymakers and authorities to 
manage.”). 
200  Lizzie Dearden, Refugee Crisis: Fences Failing to Stop Asylum Seekers Arriving in Europe as Migrants Take 
Covert Routes, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 8, 2016), http://perma.cc/5NK5-LKSM. 
201  BROWN, supra note 184, at 91; see also Abrahamian, supra note 185 (“[Walls are] theatrical 
performances of a nation-state sovereignty severely eroded by globalization.”). 
202  Asylum Applicants in the EU: 2016, EUROSTAT, http://perma.cc/5BP4-7TYY (last updated Mar. 
2017).  
203  Asylum Applicants in the EU: 2015, EUROSTAT, http://perma.cc/L4FA-MLR3 (last updated Feb. 
2016). 
204  See, for example, Niamh McIntyre & Mark Rice-Oxley, It’s 34,361 and Rising: How the List Tallies 
Europe’s Migrant Bodycount, THE GUARDIAN (June 20, 2018), http://perma.cc/JL3B-MTLG (A boat 
carrying more than 500 people capsized off Lampedusa, Italy, in May 2017.); Lori Hinnant & Bram 
Jassen, 56,800 Migrant Dead and Missing: ‘They Are Human Beings,’ AP REPORT (Nov. 2, 2018), 
http://perma.cc/W7C8-ENCP (“[M]ore than 800 people died in an April 2015 shipwreck off the 
coast of Italy, Europe’s deadliest migrant sea disaster. An Associated Press tally has documented at 
least 56,800 migrants dead or missing worldwide since 2014.”). 
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[Migration control policies have] made it impossible for migrants to take the 
easy corridors, forcing them instead to venture longer and more dangerous 
crossings, because desperate asylees are still willing to take the risk, for the 
chance of living a life of dignity, finding a safe haven. In what seems to be a 
self-sustaining dynamic, every new route prompts new control initiatives and 
vice versa.205  
Walls have elicited additional human rights costs, including preventing asylum 
seekers from accessing protection, refouling individuals to places where they risk 
serious harm, abuse at the hands of border guards and other government agents, 
and use of the threat of detention as a deterrent, among others.206 
D. Buttressing the Fortress 
While there was not a huge dip in applications from 2015 to 2016, first-time 
applicants in Europe decreased significantly in 2017 (649,855 applicants)207 and 
2018 (580,845 applicants).208 This phenomenon appears to be the result of newly-
implemented legal barriers to entry, in combination with existing physical barriers. 
While a comprehensive exploration of Europe’s legal barriers is beyond the scope 
of this Article, the “failure of Dublin” argument posited herein applies to both 
physical and legal barriers: walls and fences have established the physical 
manifestation of Fortress Europe, and legal barriers have fortified it. E.U. border 
states like Hungary have perverted the Safe Third Country doctrine to relieve itself 
from responsibility for refugees, and the E.U. as a whole has done the same 
through the E.U.–Turkey Deal. Other laws and policies preventing refugees from 
entering Europe include push-backs and push-back laws (both at land and sea 
borders) and state of emergency laws, among others. 
The two types of barriers—physical and legal—form a formidable 
combination. The E.U.–Turkey Deal209 is one example of a “legal wall.” It is 
deemed responsible for the dramatic decrease in asylum seekers that Europe 
witnessed in 2017 and 2018.210 While the E.U.–Turkey Deal did not stop all 
                                                 
205  THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, The Refugee, the Sovereign, and the Sea: European Union Interdiction 
Policies, in SOVEREIGNTY GAMES: INSTRUMENTALIZING STATES SOVEREIGNTY IN EUROPE AND 
BEYOND 172 (Rebecca Adler-Nissen & Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen eds., 2008). 
206  See The Human Cost of Fortress Europe, supra note 192, at 11; Europe’s Borderlands, supra note 1, at 35. 
207  Asylum Applicants in the E.U.: 2017, EUROSTAT, http://perma.cc/KZ6H-T8NA (last updated Mar. 
2018). 
208  Asylum Applicants in the E.U.: 2018, EUROSTAT, http://perma.cc/R5R8-NLGM (last updated Mar. 
2019).  
209  Press Release, European Council, E.U.–Turkey Statement (Mar. 18, 2016), http://perma.cc/4ELL-
BCW4 [hereinafter European Council Press Release].  
210  See, for example, Elena Becatoros, 3 Years On, What’s Become of the E.U.–Turkey Migration Deal?, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 20, 2019), http://perma.cc/Z8EJ-HCQP (“On a very basic level of 
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arrivals on Greek Islands, the “numbers are far lower than the thousands per day 
in 2015 and early 2016.”211 The Deal created an arrangement whereby “all new 
irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands . . . will be returned to 
Turkey . . . [and] Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or 
land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU.”212 Turkey has a 
vested interest in performing its gate-keeping role to prevent migrants from 
leaving Turkey for Greece, including incentives such as the E.U.’s promise of six 
billion euros and visa-liberalization for Turkish nationals.213 Human Rights 
watchdogs have decried the E.U.–Turkey Deal for violating the principle of non-
refoulement and refugee rights more broadly.214 Additionally, UNHCR and the 
International Organization for Migration have reported that the death rate for 
those attempting to cross the Mediterranean has risen since the passage of the 
E.U.–Turkey Deal as the remaining “available” routes to Europe become more 
dangerous, even though the total number of asylum seekers attempting to reach 
Europe has decreased.215 
                                                 
reducing the number of asylum-seekers heading to other European countries, the deal was very 
effective.”). 
211  See id.; see also European Commission, E.U.–Turkey Statement: Two Years On, at 1 (Apr. 2018), 
http://perma.cc/8W2K-4FYG (“Two years later, irregular arrivals remain 97% lower than the 
period before the Statement became operational.”). 
212  European Council Press Release, supra note 209. The Deal also provided that “[f]or every Syrian 
being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the 
EU,” however this has not provided effective protection for asylum seekers, nor has it been 
implemented effectively. See, for example, Gloria Fernández Arribas, The E.U.–Turkey Agreement: A 
Controversial Attempt at Patching up a Major Problem, 1 EUR. PAPERS 1097–1104 (2016), 
http://perma.cc/8LVU-L9CF (noting difficulties that non-Syrians face in gaining protection in 
Turkey or Europe; that Syrians who tried entering Greece irregularly “have been banned” from 
benefiting from this provision; the limited number of spaces available through the plan that also 
“depend on the good will of the [E.U.] States”; and the small number of refugees who have been 
resettled under this scheme). 
213  European Council Press Release, supra note 209. 
214  See, for example, Dearden, supra note 200 (“Human rights groups have been raising concern about 
the E.U.–Turkey deal, which sees all migrants arriving on Greek islands detained in camps and 
threatened with deportation if their asylum claims fail.”); Kondylia Gogou, The E.U.–Turkey Deal: 
Europe’s Year of Shame, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 20, 2017), http://perma.cc/959T-2QKR (“The 
premise on which the deal was constructed—namely that Turkey is a safe place for refugees—was 
flawed. In the months following the deal, Greece’s asylum appeals committees ruled in many 
instances that Turkey does not provide effective protection for refugees.”); Greece: Government Defies 
Court on Asylum Seekers, Reinstates Containment Policy That Keeps People Trapped on Islands, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Apr. 25, 2018), http://perma.cc/CLJ6-S4DY (“By the latest government count, more than 
15,400 asylum seekers are on the Greek islands. Many are living in crowded and filthy processing 
centers, and many spent the winter in lightweight tents or even sleeping outside on the ground.”). 
215  See, for example, UNHCR, Mediterranean Crossings Deadlier Than Ever, New UNHCR Report Shows (Sept. 
3, 2018), http://perma.cc/S5GF-PW8F (“In the Central Mediterranean, one person died or went 
missing for every 18 people who crossed to Europe between January and July 2018, compared to 
one death for every 42 people who crossed in the same period in 2017.”); Missing Migrants Project, 
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For a country-specific example, the Hungarian government’s actions since 
summer 2015 illustrate the combined power of physical and legal walls. Hungary 
has used a wide range of strategies to block entries, reject the small number of 
refugees who are actually able to make asylum claims, and deter people from 
coming in the first place. It has “made seeking asylum like a game of Chutes and 
Ladders—where the ladders are few and far between, and the chutes are 
plentiful.”216 The Hungarian government employed a number of laws and policies 
to augment its border fences since 2015, including: “(1) naming Serbia a safe third 
country and issuing inadmissibility decisions on that basis; (2) relying on a push-
back law that provides that anyone found in Hungary without status can be 
immediately expelled over the Southern border in the direction of Serbia—even 
if they wish to claim asylum; (3) restricting asylum applications to two transit zones 
on the border with Serbia and only allowing one applicant per zone per workday 
to enter; and (4) arbitrarily detaining refugees in the transit zone shipping 
containers while their applications are processed.”217 The rapidly decreasing rate 
of asylum seekers in Hungary from 2015–2018 demonstrates the success of this 
combination of strategies. While there were 177,135 asylum seekers in 2015, by 
2016, there were only 29,432 asylum seekers in Hungary.218 In 2017, the number 
of asylum seekers fell to 3,397.219 In 2018, Hungary received only 670 asylum 
applications.220 
The E.U.–Turkey Deal roughly halved the number of asylum applicants 
Europe received from 2015–2016 to 2017–2018. Although this was a significant 
decrease, some asylum seekers were able to find alternative, albeit more 
dangerous, routes to Europe. This excluded individuals who were not physically 
able to make the journey and those who could not afford the assistance of 
smugglers in navigating more covert pathways. Hungary’s actions, on the other 
hand, ensured that almost no one could apply for asylum. Just as physical walls 
beget more walls, legal walls will influence the development of additional legal 
barriers as asylum seekers are re-routed to neighboring countries in Europe. If this 
trend continues, the total number of asylum seekers who are able to lodge 
                                                 
INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, http://perma.cc/9E8E-5DGZ (last updated July 31, 2019) (noting 
that the “proportion of deaths” versus “attempted crossings” increased from 2.3 percent in 2018 
to 3.15 percent in 2019.). 
216  Armstrong, supra note 6, at 49. 
217  Id. at 50; see also id. at 46–72 (discussing Hungary’s fences, use of safe third country, deep border 
control policy, and constitutional amendments, among other externalization methods). 
218  Id. at 77 (Table 1: Protection Decisions in Hungary, 2014–2017). 
219  Id.  
220  Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Statistics, Hungary: Applications and Granting of Protection Status at First 
Instance: 2018, ASYLUM INFORMATION DATABASE, http://perma.cc/7Y5V-N232 (last accessed July 
31, 2019).  
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protection claims in Europe will likely decrease dramatically, just as in Hungary. 
Fortress Europe will be nearly impenetrable. 
Walls and fences—whether physical or legal—do not exempt states from 
upholding their international and regional legal obligations. As I have discussed 
elsewhere, sovereignty does not, cannot, justify state action to prevent asylum 
seekers from applying for legal protection.221 While states generally retain control 
over their borders,222 this power is not absolute. The right of a state to control its 
borders is circumscribed by international and regional treaties,223 as well as 
customary international law224 and jus cogens.225 One of the fundamental exceptions 
to blocking access at the border is invoked when the result would be a violation 
of the non-refoulement principle. Non-refoulement is a customary international 
legal norm that “clearly place[s] limits on what states may lawfully do” to persons 
seeking protection in their territory.226 The 1951 Refugee Convention prohibits 
states from “[returning] a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened.”227 This includes both direct 
refoulement and chain refoulement, or onward expulsion.228 International and regional 
                                                 
221  Armstrong, supra note 6, at 27–29. 
222  See, for example, U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶¶ 1 (sovereign nation principle), 7 (noninterference). 
223  “[These obligations are] binding upon the parties . . . and must be performed by them in good 
faith.” Vienna Convention, supra note 49, at art. 26; see also Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. 
U.K., App. No. 9214/80, 9473/81, and 9474/81, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 67 (1985) (noting that the ability 
to control the entry of non-nationals onto one’s territory is limited by a State’s “treaty obligations”). 
224  Customary international law is binding and represents “well-established state practices to which a 
sense of obligation has come to be attached.” JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 5, 29 (Cornell Univ. Press 3d ed. 2013). Further, “customary international 
norm[s] binds all governments whether or not they have accepted it so long as they have not 
expressly and persistently objected to its development.” CONNIE DE LA VEGA, DICTIONARY OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 34 (2013). 
225  See U.N. Committee against Torture, supra note 48; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 49, at art. 
53 (noting that jus cogens is “a peremptory norm of general international law . . . a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted . . . .”). 
226  Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the Principle of Non-Refoulement, 23 
INT’L J. REF. L. 443, 444 (2011); see also Goodwin-Gill, The Language of Protection, supra note 57, at 7 
(“trac[ing] the emergence and development of the concept of international protection”). 
227  1951 Convention, supra note 34, at art. 33(1) (noting that, under refugee law, the risk must be based 
on account of the individual’s race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion). 
228  The principle of non-refoulment “protects persons from being transferred to a State which may 
not itself threaten the individual, but which would not effectively protect the person against onward 
transfer in violation of the principle of non-refoulement (called indirect, chain or 
secondary refoulement).” Tilman Rodenhäuser, The principle of non-refoulement in the migration context: 5 
key points (March, 30 2018), ReliefWeb, http://perma.cc/8G3S-BV4C. 
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human rights law also prohibits refouling individuals to any State where they 
would be “in danger of being subjected to torture” or inhuman and degrading 
treatment.229 Respecting the principle of non-refoulement prohibits rejection at 
the border without first assessing an asylum seeker’s protection claim; a state 
cannot be certain that its actions will not amount to refoulement before evaluating 
an individual’s protection needs.230 The ECtHR has supported this conclusion, 
underscoring that states are responsible wherever they exercise “effective control 
and authority.”231 Thus, when states erect physical and legal barriers that prevent 
                                                 
229  See Convention against Torture, supra note 48, at arts. 3, 16 (Article 3 prohibits refouling an 
individual to where they risk being tortured; article 16 expands refoulement to where there is a risk 
of inhuman or degrading treatment.). Note that this conception of non-refoulement is broader than 
under the 1951 Convention, which requires the risk of harm to be based on account of one of five 
protected grounds. The ECHR also prohibits subjecting an individual to “torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” ECHR, supra note 133, at art. 3. The ECtHR has interpreted 
this as prohibiting refoulement. See, for example, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, supra note 133, at 
¶ 114; Ilias and Ahmed v. Hung., supra note 133, at ¶ 112; see also N. S. v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department and M.E. and Others, supra note 137 (If “systemic deficiencies” in either the 
destination State’s asylum system and/or reception conditions give the current host State 
“substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected 
to inhuman or degrading treatment,” transfer to that state would violate CFR article 4.). 
230  See, for example, Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Protection of Asylum-Seekers in 
Situations of Large-Scale Influx, No. 22 (II) (2) (XXXII), U.N. Doc. A/36/12 (Oct. 21, 1981) (“In all 
cases the fundamental principle of non-refoulement including non-rejection at the frontier-must be 
scrupulously observed.”); Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Conclusions Adopted by 
the Executive Committee on International Protection of Refugees, No. 81(h) (XLVII), U.N. Doc. A/52/12 
(Oct. 17, 1997) (“[A] comprehensive approach to refugee protection comprises, inter alia, respect 
for all human rights; the principle of non-refoulement; access, consistent with the 1951 Convention 
and the 1967 Protocol, of all asylum seekers to fair and effective procedures for determining status 
and protection needs; no rejection at frontiers without the application of these procedures.”); Exec. 
Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Conclusion on Safeguarding Asylum, No. 82(d)(iii) (XLVIII), 
U.N. Doc. A/52/12 (Oct. 17, 1997); Exec. Comm. of the High Comm’r’s Programme, Conclusion 
on International Protection, No. 85(q) (XLIX), U.N. Doc. A/53/12 (Oct. 9, 1998); Exec. Comm. of 
the High Comm’r’s Programme, General Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on the 
International Protection of Refugees, No. 99 (l) (LV), U.N. Doc. 12A/59/12 (Oct. 8, 2004) (“while 
ensuring full respect for the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, including non-rejection at 
frontiers without access to fair and effective procedures for determining status and protection 
needs”). Scholars have also supported this assertion. See, for example, Costello, supra note 94, at 236 
(“The weight of authority is now that [non-refoulement] also applies to rejection at the frontier.”); 
FITZGERALD, supra note 29, at 33 n.58; see also id. at 170 (citing THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, 
ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND THE GLOBALISATION OF MIGRATION 
CONTROL 74 (2011)) (“Notably, EU member states have established the non-refoulement 
obligation to apply in border situations.”). 
231  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, supra note 133, at ¶ 69 (stating that the test for state responsibility 
is whether a person falls “under the effective control and authority of that State”); see also id. at ¶ 60 
(Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring) (“Immigration and border control is a primary State function 
and all forms of this control result in the exercise of the State’s jurisdiction. The full range of 
conceivable immigration and border policies . . . all constitute forms of exercise of the State 
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asylum seekers from lodging their protection claims and force them back to unsafe 
places, they violate their non-refoulement obligation.232 Regarding the two 
examples above, both Hungary’s actions and the E.U.–Turkey Deal have been 
denounced for violating the principle of non-refoulement.233 
V. SOLVING EUROPE’S “DUBLIN CRISIS” 
For over twenty-five years now, the EU and its Member States have been attempting to get 
the Dublin system to work. The continued abject failures of those attempts to get this pig to 
fly never seem to deter the next attempt to launch its aviation career.234 
The Dublin system has failed in many ways, but it is particularly egregious in 
how it has facilitated the construction of Fortress Europe, encouraging European 
states to erect walls and other barriers to keep refugees out. This Article does not 
attempt to offer a comprehensive solution to this very complex problem; its 
project is much more limited in scope. This Article does, however, explore several 
proposed solutions, critiquing shortcomings and identifying characteristics of an 
ideal solution. This Section begins with game theory’s explanation of why 
achieving consensus on Dublin reform is an incredibly difficult undertaking. It 
then describes and evaluates the E.U. Commission’s Proposal and UNHCR’s 
recommended modifications, the European Parliament Committee’s amended 
proposal, flexible solidarity, and free choice. 
                                                 
function of border control and a manifestation of State jurisdiction, wherever they take place and 
whoever carries them out.”). 
232  See, for example, id. at ¶ 73 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., concurring) (“The non-refoulement obligation has 
two procedural consequences: the duty to advise an alien of his or her rights to obtain international 
protection and the duty to provide for an individual, fair and effective refugee status determination 
and assessment procedure.”). 
233  See, for example, Armstrong, supra note 6 (arguing that Hungary’s “Chutes and Ladders” asylum 
system violates its non-refoulement obligations, as Hungary expels or pushes back almost all asylum 
seekers to Serbia, which cannot be deemed a safe third country); Jenny Poon, E.U.–Turkey Deal: 
Violation of, or Consistency with, International Law? 1 EUR. PAPERS 1195 (2016), 
http://perma.cc/CN7L-QMMW (arguing that Turkey is not a “safe third country” and that the 
E.U.–Turkey Deal violates international law); Enzo Rossi & Paolo Iafrate, The E.U. Agreement with 
Turkey: Does it Jeopardize Refugees’ Rights?, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. (Dec. 16, 2016), 
http://perma.cc/L23L-TYEZ (arguing that the E.U.’s agreement with Turkey violates the rights 
of refugees and the E.U. prohibition on collective expulsions; noting the that the Deal risks violating 
the principle of non-refoulement and leading to forcible returns; and expressing doubt that Turkey 
could be considered a “safe third country” since Turkey maintains a geographic limitation to its 
ratification of the 1951 Convention, in addition to other factors). 
234  Farahat & Markard, supra note 114, at 943 (internal citation omitted). 
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A. Failure to Cooperate 
The unprecedented volume of asylum seekers arriving in Europe during the 
height of the recent refugee crisis overwhelmed border countries like Italy and 
Greece235 and highlighted the need to reform the Dublin system. The temporary 
relocation scheme meant to alleviate these two frontline states, mentioned earlier, 
illustrates that ad hoc, unenforceable quota mechanisms will likely not achieve 
desired results.236 Game theory’s “Suasion/Rambo” game237 helps explain why a 
satisfactory solution is difficult to attain and further demonstrates why this issue 
will require political compromise. The Suasion/Rambo game predicts that 
cooperative states will be unable to coerce uncooperative states to reach an 
agreement. The states that support cooperation are those who receive large 
numbers of refugees and would benefit from an equitable responsibility-sharing 
mechanism. The states that oppose cooperation are those that do not typically 
receive many asylum seekers. They benefit from the current state of affairs and 
have no incentive to agree to a system that would make them responsible for 
additional refugees. Given this preference for the status quo, these states act as 
“rambos,” imposing their dominant strategy (noncooperation) on other states 
who would prefer cooperation.238 To change the game’s equilibrium, cooperative 
states must “sweeten the deal” by including incentives (“issue-linkage”) to 
persuade noncooperative states to change their position.239 
                                                 
235  See Resolution of 18 May 2017 on Making Relocation Happen, EUR. PARL. DOC. 2017/2685(RSP) 
(2017); Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, 
Progress Report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration, COM (2018) 301 final (May 
16, 2018). 
236  See, for example, 2015 Quota Scheme, supra note 153. 
237  See, for example, THOMAS DIEZ, INGVILD BODE & ALEKSANDRA FERNANDES DA COSTA, KEY 
CONCEPTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 71 (2011) (“[S]uasion games are useful to analyse 
situations with pronounced asymmetrical interests of the players.” The player dubbed the “Rambo” 
has “defection as the dominant strategy” and “determines the game’s outcome, leaving the other 
player dissatisfied.” They only way to reach a different equilibrium is to alter the Rambo’s 
preferences “through either issue-linkage or side-payments.”). 
238  Natascha Zaun, Member States as “Rambos” in E.U. Asylum Politics: The Case of Permanent Refugee Quotas, 
in THE NEW ASYLUM AND TRANSIT COUNTRIES IN EUROPE DURING AND IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
THE 2015/2016 CRISIS 218–19 (Vladislava Stoyanova & Eleni Karageorgiou eds., 2019) (explaining 
the Suasion/Rambo game). 
239  Id. at 231–32 (“Game theory suggests that the Suasion/Rambo Game dynamics can be overcome 
only through issue-linkage, i.e. if Member States in favour of the quota system and the Commission 
find a potential package deal that the opponents of permanent refugee quotas could agree to.”). 
The “purse” is one potential pressure point for compliance; for example, Hungary received $5.5 
billion from the E.U. in 2016. See Griff Witte and Michael Birnbaum, In Eastern Europe, the E.U. 
Faces a Rebellion More Threatening than Brexit, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018), http://perma.cc/5XCK-
8CRT. 
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B. Dublin IV 
When the E.U. Commission realized that it would be unable to achieve 
consensus on a permanent distribution quota in 2016,240 it proposed an 
amendment to the Dublin system (“Dublin IV”) that would facilitate 
redistribution in times of mass influx. In its 2016 report, the Commission listed a 
“fair system for determining the Member State responsible for asylum seekers” as 
one of its five CEAS reform priorities.241 To achieve a fairer system, the 
Commission initially proposed amending Dublin, either by adding a “corrective 
fairness mechanism,” or by establishing “a new system based on a distribution 
key.”242 Under either option, the state where an asylum seeker entered the E.U. 
would still be responsible for registration and fingerprinting, and “returning those 
not in need of protection.”243 The first option would essentially maintain the 
current system but allow for redistribution if a certain threshold is reached in a 
member state. The second option would establish a new system, where 
responsibility would not depend on where an asylum seeker first entered the E.U., 
but on a “distribution key reflecting the relative size, wealth and absorption 
capacities of the Member States.”244 The Commission also introduced a longer-
term solution whereby the E.U. could centrally process asylum seekers and then 
distribute them among member states based on a distribution key, but it 
acknowledged that the time was not yet politically ripe for such a mechanism.245 
The Commission ultimately proposed the corrective mechanism solution, which 
would apply when a member state receives asylum applications exceeding 150% 
of its assigned “reference key.”246 Under the proposal, a member state’s reference 
                                                 
240  See, for example, Eszter Zalan, E.U. Migrant Quota Idea is Finished, Fico Says, E.U. OBSERVER (Sept. 27, 
2016), http://perma.cc/VQP9-TX7L (“Slovak prime minister Robert Fico, whose country holds 
the rotating presidency of the EU, has declared the idea of migration quotas ‘politically finished.’”). 
241  Communication from the Commission, supra note 94, at 6. 
242  Id. at 6–9. 
243  Id. at 7 (further acknowledging that this might require E.U. financial assistance to border countries 
in the spirit of “solidarity”).  
244  Id. at 8. 
245  Id. at 8–9 (“[I]n the long term, consideration could be given to the possibility of transferring 
responsibility for the processing of asylum claims from the national to the EU level.”); see also 
ELSPETH GUILD, CATHRYN COSTELLO, MADELINE GARLICK, VIOLETA MORENO-LAX, & MINOS 
MOUZOURAKIS, NEW APPROACHES, ALTERNATIVE AVENUES AND MEANS OF ACCESS TO ASYLUM 
PROCEDURES FOR PERSONS SEEKING INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 50–59 (2014). 
246  Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria 
and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International 
Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-country National or a Stateless Person (recast), COM 
(2016) 270 final/2 (May 4, 2016), http://perma.cc/CES7-LP9G [hereinafter Commission Proposal 
for Member State Responsibility]. 
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key would be based on two criteria with equal weighting: population size and 
GDP.247 The Commission believed this solution would successfully support 
member states experiencing a “disproportionate number of asylum seekers”248 and 
“ensure a fair sharing of responsibility between Member States.”249 
In response to the Commission’s proposal, in December 2016 the UNHCR 
recommended several “important modifications” to achieve a “fair and workable” 
relocation mechanism for states receiving a disproportionate number of asylum 
claims.250 The UNHCR’s approach for aiding member states under pressure 
started with employing a common registration system and piloting “Registration 
and Processing Centres” in the main countries of entry.251 Then, to improve the 
speed of dealing with large numbers of arrivals, UNHCR suggested processing 
both manifestly unfounded claims252 and manifestly well-founded claims253 in an 
accelerated procedure in the country of arrival, with the support of E.U. 
agencies.254 For cases that were neither manifestly unfounded nor well-founded, 
distribution would occur immediately, and the receiving member state would 
evaluate the asylum claim. Distribution would be based on the reference key 
“deemed fair” by member states, and applicants would be offered the opportunity 
                                                 
247  Id. at 18. 
248  Id. at 4. 
249  Id. at 18. 
250  UNHCR, Better Protecting Refugees in the E.U. and Globally: UNHCR’s Proposals to Rebuild Trust Through 
Better Management, Partnership and Solidarity, 14 (Dec. 2016), http://perma.cc/7HEN-RZCQ. This 
UNHCR publication offers proposals on several topics, including addressing drivers of migration, 
facilitating safe pathways for those in need of protection, dealing with situations of large-scale 
refugee influx, improving the current asylum system, and integrating refugees. Here, I specifically 
discuss UNHCR’s proposal related to a “distribution mechanism for E.U. Member States under 
pressure.” Id. at 3; see also id. at 1–15, 21. 
251  Id. at 10–11 (Countries of entry would be assisted by E.U. agencies in operating these centers, and 
such a mechanism would “[b]uild[] on the lessons learned from the E.U. ‘hotspot’ Approach.”); see 
also Collett & Le Coz, supra note 164, at 11–12 (noting implementation and reception condition 
issues with the E.U.’s use of “hotspots” in 2015 to manage arrivals). 
252  UNHCR defines manifestly unfounded claims as those “applications from persons who clearly have 
no valid claim to international protection based on established criteria or which are clearly 
fraudulent or abusive.” Better Protecting Refugees, supra note250, at 15 n.23. 
253  UNHCR defines manifestly well-founded claims as those that “clearly indicate the applicant meets 
the criteria for international protection. Such cases are likely to have claims linked to specific profiles 
that have been established as giving rise to a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm owing 
to the situation in the country [sic] origin.” Id. at 15 n.25. 
254  For the unfounded claims, return would be executed with “increased E.U. Agency support.” For 
well-founded claims, distribution to another member state would occur after protection is granted. 
Id. 
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to provide “relevant information”255 and have their preferences “taken into 
account to the extent possible”256 prior to transfer. Arguably, the UNHCR 
proposal’s most important improvement upon the E.U. Commission’s plan was 
that the corrective mechanism would activate once a member state reached the 
E.U.-determined capacity (“reference share”) and would only cease once the 
situation in the member state under pressure had “normalized.”257 The UNHCR 
recommendation also included a special procedure for dealing with 
unaccompanied and separated children,258 and noted the need for incentives to 
ensure compliance by both member states and applicants.259 The UNHCR 
maintains these recommendations today as the E.U. continues working on CEAS 
reform.260 
In October 2017, the European Parliament Committee adopted a report on 
the Commission’s proposal and offered an amended proposal of its own—a 
“permanent and automatic relocation mechanism, without thresholds.”261 This 
mechanism prioritized relocation based on links to member states—such as the 
presence of family members or states where the applicant has studied in the past.262 
                                                 
255  UNHCR, UNHCR Comments on the European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State 
Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a 
Third-country National or a Stateless Person (recast), at 32, COM (2016) 270, (Dec. 2016), 
http://perma.cc/HQM7-UZRW (“[A]n applicant should be given an effective possibility to 
provide relevant information to the benefiting Member State, whilst no personal interviews are 
specifically foreseen prior to a transfer under the corrective allocation mechanism.”). 
256  Id. at 34 (“Objective factors should be considered, including the “presence of extended family, any 
previous regular stay in a Member State, study, work or concrete employment possibilities . . .”). 
257  Id. (“If it is to have a real corrective effect, the threshold for cessation of the allocation mechanism 
should be lower than the threshold for its activation. Additionally, UNHCR proposes the activation 
of the corrective allocation mechanism as soon as a Member State reaches the reference share.”). 
258  See Better Protecting Refugees, supra note 250, at 16; UNHCR Comments on the European Commission 
Proposal, supra note 255, at 33 (noting concerns about children, particularly unaccompanied children, 
accessing the asylum procedure).  
259  Id. at 16–17. 
260  UNHCR still maintains its recommendations in Better Protecting Refugees. See, for example, UNHCR, 
UNHCR’s Recommendations for the Finnish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), June 2019, 
http://perma.cc/3AQD-3YSA (“These priorities form the foundation of UNHCR’s full 
recommendations for the Finnish Presidency, and are to be read in conjunction with UNHCR’s 
‘Better Protecting Refugees in the E.U. and Globally.’”). 
261  Report on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for 
Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a 
Third-country National or a Stateless Person (recast), EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 0270) 112, amend. 
25 (2017), http://perma.cc/4G5K-73NL [hereinafter Report on Proposal for Member State 
Responsibility]. 
262  Id. at amend. 11. 
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Applicants that lack such links would be relocated through the proposed 
“corrective allocation system”—which automatically applies, as opposed to the 
Commission proposal that would require a state to reach 150 percent of its 
designated absorption capacity.263 The corrective mechanism distribution key 
would be calculated in the same manner as the Commission’s proposal (that is, 
equal weighting of the member state’s population size and GDP),264 and applicants 
would be able to choose where they were relocated among the four states with the 
fewest applicants “in relation to their fair share.”265 The Parliament proposal also 
included several carrots and sticks266 to ensure both applicant and member state 
compliance: 
1. Incentivizing applicant registration in the state of entry: Applicants 
must register in the first state of entry to take advantage of 
distribution based on links to a member state or, where a link does 
not exist, to enjoy the option of choosing among the four least-
burdened states.267 If the applicant fails to register in the first state of 
entry, he will be relocated to the least-burdened country by default.268 
2. Combating the “pull factor” associated with having a choice between 
four host states: Applicants will not know in advance the identity of 
the four least-burdened countries.269 
3. Dissuading economic migrants from taking advantage of the system: 
Applicants who have “very low chances” of receiving asylum will not 
be relocated but processed in the state of entry. That member state 
will receive E.U. funds to offset processing costs.270 
4. Financial incentives: Member states will receive E.U. funds for 
reception and transfer costs.271 
5. Ensuring Member State cooperation: Member states that fail to 
register incoming applicants will be sanctioned:272 
                                                 
263  Compare id. at amend. 25 with Commission Proposal for Member State Responsibility, supra note 
246. 
264  Report on Proposal for Member State Responsibility, supra note 261, at 20, amend. 25. 
265  Id. at amend. 69. 
266  Id. at amend. 12 (“[P]rocedures should be put in place to ensure the cooperation of applicants and 
Member States, with a clear system of incentives and disincentives to ensure compliance.”). 
267  Id. at amend. 11. 
268  Id. at amend. 152. 
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a. Applicants will not be relocated from member states of first 
entry who fail to register incoming applicants; and 
b. Member states will lose the ability to use E.U. funds to return 
rejected asylum applicants if they fail to accept relocated 
applicants in their country. 
In a number of ways, the Committee’s proposal heeded the UNHCR’s 
recommendations, including prioritizing refugee links to member states when 
considering relocation, providing refugees without links some choice in where 
they would be transferred, immediate activation of the corrective allocation 
system once a member state reaches capacity (as opposed to the Commission’s 
150% threshold), and employing carrots and sticks to ensure compliance by both 
member states and applicants. 
Unfortunately, one major obstacle to reforming the current Dublin system 
is the lack of E.U. solidarity in the context of rising populist nationalism. 
However, in its report, the European Parliament Committee underscored the 
Council’s power to decide this matter, even if resisted by noncooperative member 
states: “The Council is clearly allowed to decide on this regulation by majority 
voting and their focus must now be on finding a system that will work on the 
ground, and not only one that can reach unanimity in the Council.”273 It remains 
unclear how the E.U. will effectively compel noncooperative states to participate, 
or admonish those who refuse to comply. Given these political difficulties, former 
E.U. President and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico advocated that member 
states should engage in “flexible solidarity,” “whereby countries that do not want 
to take migrants could contribute to the EU’s migration policy with other means, 
financially.”274 However, the UNHCR has affirmed unequivocally that “[f]ull 
participation in the mechanism needs to be secured” for it to be successful. 275 
C. Falling Short and Best Interests 
The proposed solutions, including permanent quotas, the Commission’s 
Dublin IV redistribution mechanism, Parliament’s amended redistribution plan, 
and “flexible solidarity,” all fall short. Flexible solidarity is problematic because 
poorer E.U. states (typically those on the border) who cannot afford to “buy” 
their way out of hosting refugees would remain responsible for processing an 
unfair share of asylum seekers. Solutions focused only on the provision of 
financial resources, without attention to physical responsibility-sharing, would still 
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force certain member states to serve as the E.U.’s “refugee camp,”276 and 
experience indicates that this strategy will not succeed in managing refugee flows 
and protecting refugee rights.277 This would also continue to breed dissatisfaction 
in those states that would bear an unfair physical burden, potentially fueling 
nationalist sentiment. Moreover, this strategy would contradict conceptions of 
equality where states have repeatedly identified that it is desirable and good to 
share responsibility for refugees—including, but not limited to, financial sharing.278 
Furthermore, such buy-out “flexibility” would enable states to deny entry to 
asylum seekers based on xenophobic, nationalist policies.279 A successful 
responsibility-sharing regime cannot allow member states to “buy their way out” 
of hosting persons in need of protection. 
The Commission’s proposal for Dublin IV—based on the failed 2015 
relocation quota—is also not an ideal solution. It would require that states reach 
an incredibly high threshold (150%) to activate its protections, and it has been 
criticized as “administratively unworkable” and unenforceable.280 It would also 
continue to result in border states confronting an unfair share of the responsibility 
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to process refugees,281 without support in place to assist with this financial 
burden.282 Parliament’s proposal, on the other hand, is better aligned with the spirit 
and intent of European solidarity, the international principle of responsibility-
sharing, and UNHCR recommendations. Yet, even Parliament’s solution has 
concerning flaws. First, it would still require a financial burden on the state of first 
entry.283 Second, it curiously limits transfer choice to the four least-burdened states 
rather than to all member states who are “below quota.”284 Third, its mechanism 
for state compliance would likely be ineffective in practice, “especially for 
border/first application” member states.285 Finally, enforcing transfers—which 
would become the rule rather than the exception—would also prove 
challenging.286 
In addition to addressing these criticisms, any strong, viable proposal should 
give serious consideration to the best interest of the individuals seeking 
protection.287 Placing appropriate weight on asylum seekers’ needs and wishes 
would ultimately reduce secondary movements and increase the chances of 
successful integration. The UNHCR has long supported this approach, arguing 
that “the intentions of the asylum-seeker” should be taken into account “as 
regards the country in which he wishes to request asylum . . . as far as possible.”288 
UNHCR has further noted that “the responsibility for considering an asylum 
claim lies with the Member State with which and in whose jurisdiction the claim 
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is lodged,” and that transfers should only be executed where there are “meaningful 
links” with another state.289 Related to this issue, the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles argued for “free choice as an alternative to Dublin”290 when 
Europe was considering Dublin II reform, and German NGO ProAsyl recently 
made the same recommendation for the next iteration of Dublin.291 Legal scholars 
have also advocated for free choice—that “the default position should be that the 
state with custody of the asylum seeker should assess whether the individual 
warrants international protection,” and transferring applicants should only occur 
in the context of family reunion or for humanitarian reasons.292 
Entirely “free choice” has been met with genuine concern—namely, that 
states would continue to share responsibility for refugees unequally under such a 
regime.293 While this is a valid observation, until Europe has forged a truly uniform 
asylum system where the same level of protection is offered in every member state, 
Europe must “respond to the contemporary situation.”294 The international 
refugee law regime exists for refugees to seek and enjoy protection, and allowing 
refugees to choose member states that guarantee them the best chance of 
protection fulfills that mandate. Concurrently, the E.U. must continue to work on 
harmonizing protection standards to ensure all member states are equally 
committed to providing asylum seekers refuge.295 There are also a number of 
benefits to honoring refugee choice, including obviating the need for a 
responsibility assessment and system of distribution altogether and quashing the 
incentive for secondary movements. The E.U. should seriously assess how a 
system of responsibility-allocation that honors asylum seeker choice to the 
greatest extent possible could improve upon the present experience for both 
                                                 
289  UNHCR, Revisiting the Dublin Convention, supra note 116, at 5. 
290  European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Sharing Responsibility for Refugee Protection in Europe: Dublin 
Reconsidered, at 29–30 (March 2008), http://perma.cc/79W8-MUBA. 
291  PRO. ASYL. ET AL., FOR A FREE CHOICE OF Host COUNTRY IN THE E.U. – RESPECTING REFUGEES’ 
INTERESTS (2015). 
292  See, for example, Fullerton, Asylum Crisis Italian Style, supra note 20, at 131 (noting that this would 
essentially be a “suspension” of the regulation, “[s]ince more than ninety-five percent of the total 
Dublin Transfer requests are grounded on the irregular entry provision.”). The author also notes 
that a “system in which the state where the asylum seeker files an application examines and decides 
the merits of the claim would be more efficient and more humane.” Id. at 134. 
293  See, for example, PRO ASYL ET AL., supra note 291, at 14–15 (analyzing the “objection of unequal 
distribution of refugees”). 
294  See Fullerton, Asylum Crisis Italian Style, supra note 20, at 134. 
295  The “huge disparities between Member States as to the rate of refugee status” recognition provide 
the most concrete manifestation of the failure to establish a truly common asylum system. As 
observed by UNHCR, ‘the chances of an individual asylum-seeker to find protection in the E.U. 
can vary nearly seventy-fold, depending on where he or she applies.’” Chetail, supra note 107, at 16. 
How the Dublin System Fueled Fortress Europe Armstrong 
Winter 2020 381 
member states and protection seekers, and what complementary systemic changes 
would be needed to make this feasible.296 
Currently the E.U. is at an impasse on Dublin reform297 and next steps will 
depend on the newly elected, and very fragmented, European Parliament.298 The 
ideal solution should be binding and enforceable, equitably distribute 
responsibility to process and host refugees among member states, enable asylum 
seekers’ access to protection, and honor asylum seekers’ preferences. It is, of 
course, easier to identify the characteristics of an ideal proposal than it is to 
implement a plan with these features in the current political climate. For example, 
the Visegrad Group strongly opposes any “mandatory and automatic distribution 
system.”299 Unfortunately, populist nationalism both favors the construction of 
walls and disfavors reaching an agreement that would engender equitable 
solutions.300 In this setting, game theory suggests that the only way to persuade 
noncooperative states is to change the game’s equilibrium by linking issues or 
creating incentives for cooperation.301 The new Commission will begin its work in 
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Fall 2019, when it will again consider how to effectively implement a solution that 
will promote equitable responsibility-sharing among all member states while 
guaranteeing refugee rights.302 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Refugees have no protection from their own state – indeed it is often their own government 
that is threatening to persecute them. If other countries do not let them in . . . then they may 
be condemning them to death.303 
Attempts to avoid responsibility for assisting refugees are not new,304 and 
these attempts are often exacerbated when responsibility is not distributed clearly 
or equitably—especially in the context of mass influx, protracted crises, irregular 
onward movement, mixed movement, and rescue at sea. The Dublin system was 
created during a time when European solidarity, the political climate, and refugee 
flows were much different.305 It was never intended as a responsibility-sharing 
mechanism, and the recent mass influx of refugees arriving in Europe crystalized 
how Dublin places undue burden on E.U. border states and ultimately led several 
European states to erect border barriers. These barriers have resulted in a domino 
effect, encouraging other states deeper in Europe to erect walls and fences or 
reinstitute border controls to stave off responsibility. These fences and walls, 
along with the strategic use of legal barriers, have led to the realization of Fortress 
Europe. They have also resulted in a breach of the non-refoulement obligation. 
Effective responsibility-sharing is needed to maintain a robust protection 
regime that is able to accommodate large numbers of asylum seekers and 
guarantee them the protection that international and regional law mandates—
including access to a fair and efficient asylum procedure and protection from 
refoulement. First, from a human rights perspective, “the only way to protect 
people from . . . atrocities is to ensure that [they] are able to find protection.”306 
Second, from a statist perspective, Europe’s responsibility-sharing failure wreaks 
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havoc on the entire project of a united Europe. The failure of the Dublin system 
has exacerbated “national cleavages and pit[ted] Member States against each 
other”307 at a historical moment where Europe is experiencing a dangerous rise in 
populist nationalism that further fuels fragmentation.308 Dublin has resulted in 
shifting, rather than sharing, responsibility, and has failed to realize all of its major 
objectives—including fostering a clear and workable method to determine the 
state responsible for processing a protection-seeker’s claim, and preventing 
asylum seekers in orbit and secondary movements. 
Europe needs a new modality of responsibility-allocation for asylum seekers 
that engenders and reinforces equitable sharing, unlike the current system that 
exacerbates tensions and promotes unequal distribution. Any system of 
responsibility-allocation should be equitable, enforceable, permanent, and reflect 
the best interests of protection seekers. The international human rights and 
refugee rights regimes announce state obligations to rightsholders. When a 
systemic flaw in the international or regional system contributes to or incentivizes 
the violation of those duties, that flaw must be addressed. For the refugee rights 
regime to fulfill its promise to those fleeing persecution, access to territory must 
be guaranteed. The Dublin system has fueled the development of Fortress 
Europe—a collection of walls and fences, fortified by legal barriers, that aim to 
keep refugees out. Until Europe’s asylum seeker allocation system is better aligned 
with the international principle of responsibility-sharing and respect for refugee 
rights, it will continue to exacerbate regional tensions and promote a system where 
asylum seekers face great difficulty availing themselves of the 1951 Convention’s 
protections. 
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